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Non-Technical Summary 
This study tested how giving households details about the costs and benefits of improvements 
to water services alters their preferences for what specific service improvements they think 
money should be spent on. The study was a computerised experiment undertaken by 599 
Scottish citizens. Of these, 500 completed the experiment online, 99 face-to-face. 
The experimental approach makes it possible to measure baseline responses, then to observe 
how these responses change when participants are given specific additional pieces of 
information. The study tested for and measured any systematic influence associated with the 
communication of specific costs and/or benefits. 
Eliciting Baseline Responses 
Research Question: What are citizens’ general preferences for different specific service 
improvements? 
Research Question: What would citizens deem to be an acceptable price rise for water 
charges to invest in specific service improvements? 
The study first recorded baseline preferences for specific service improvements. Three initial 
measures were taken. First, participants were given descriptions of seven aspects of water 
service that the Scottish water industry might want to improve - reducing interruptions to 
supply, reducing external sewer flooding, connecting rural supplies to the water system, 
increasing the share of renewable energy generated by the water industry, reducing leakage in 
supply pipes, improving drinking water look, taste and smell, and improving cleanliness of 
rivers, seas and beaches. Participants then ranked these in order of importance to them. Four 
of these were target improvements (which, unbeknownst to participants, were the four 
improvements that were pre-selected to be used in all later stages). These were broadly 
personal (reducing interruptions to supply, reducing external sewer flooding), or societal 
(connecting rural supplies to the water system, increasing the share of renewable energy 
generated by the water industry), improvements, and were selected by the researchers in 
agreement with the water industry. 
Second, participants were asked to allocate an amount of investment between the four target 
improvements, using a set of sliders that required them to split 100% of investment between 
the four improvements. The design of these sliders made the trade-offs required salient: in order 
to invest more in one improvement, the amount spent on others had to be reduced. 
Lastly, participants were asked the maximum they would be willing to increase their current 
water charge by if the revenue raised was to be spent on the target improvements. Each 
participant was told their current annual water charge (based on the council tax band they 
provided). Participants could increase this amount, or leave it at its current level, but could not 
decrease their water charge below its current level. Increases were in expressed in pounds and 
pence with no reference to inflation. 
Overall, at the individual level, there was a lot of variety in preferences: different participants 
had different priorities for improvements, both when ranking them and when allocating 
investment using the sliders. This largely averaged out, meaning that no single improvement 
clearly stood out as most (or least) important. There was strong consistency between rankings 
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of improvements and allocations using the sliders. Younger participants and those who 
undertook the study face-to-face were more likely to favour societal improvements. 
Approximately 60% of participants indicated that they would accept some price rise to invest 
in the target improvements. Of these, the average acceptable price rise was £18.41 (a 4.2% 
increase on current charges). The remaining 40% indicated that they would not accept any price 
rise. Face-to-face participants were willing to increase their charges by approximately double 
that of online participants. 
Answer: Individual participants displayed strong and consistent preferences. However, 
because households had contrasting views, across the population as a whole no given service 
improvement stood out as more or less popular. 
Answer: Most citizens were willing to increase their water bill when the revenue was to be 
used to improve specific service benefits. These citizens were willing to increase their water 
bills by 4.2%. 
Effect of Learning about Costs and Time Horizons 
Research Question: How does providing people with the costs and time horizons of different 
specific service improvements alter their priorities and acceptance of price rises to fund 
improvements? 
Revealing more detailed information about the cost and timing of target improvements – what 
people can expect in return for their money – could systematically change participants’ views 
about where investment should be directed and what constitutes an acceptable charge. Having 
established their baseline responses, we showed participants the estimated unit costs of making 
each improvement (based on approximations provided by the Scottish water industry). This 
detailed the amount of the improvement expected for a given increase in investment. It was 
new information that participants would be very unlikely to know beforehand. They were then 
asked again to allocate investment to each target improvement using sliders. They could also 
change the price rise that they deemed to be acceptable for these improvements. 
Next, they were shown different time horizons for the benefits of each improvement to be felt. 
These were not based on industry estimates but were plausible round numbers. Time horizons 
were pseudo-randomised between participants: the personal improvements were randomly 
allocated “Immediately” or “5 Year” time horizons, and the societal improvements were 
randomly allocated “10 Year” or “25 Year” time horizons. As before, they were then asked to 
allocate investment to each target improvement using the sliders and could change the 
acceptable price rise as they wished.  
Thus, by incrementally providing information this study measured if, and how, learning 
additional information alters people’s views about where investment should be directed and 
how much they might pay for it. 
The results showed that, in fact, learning about costs and time horizons had little impact on 
citizens’ stated priorities. The most notable change was that the allocations to improvements 
that would be realised immediately, rather than in 5-25 years’ time, increased by 1.4 percentage 
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points. However, while this is consistent with previous findings that show that people prefer 
immediate gains to later ones, the effect was much smaller than is generally observed. 
Respondents were largely willing to take a long-term view, at least when investment was 
directed to their preferred improvements. 
Changes to acceptable charges were also minor. When costs were revealed, 14.7% increased 
their acceptable price rise, and 1.2% reduced it (84.1% of participants did not change it), 
increasing the average acceptable price rise by £1.06. Likewise, when time horizons were 
revealed, 7.5% increased their acceptable price rise, and 1.3% reduced it (91.2% of participants 
did not change it), increasing the average acceptable price rise by a further £0.47. 
Answer:  Priorities for improvements are hardly changed by learning about the costs and time 
horizons involved.  
Answer:  Information about costs and time horizons increases the acceptability of price rises 
for some participants. 
Summary 
The experimental method provided clear answers to the research questions asked. Overall, the 
findings can be summarised as four key results: 
1. There is substantial variation in the preferences of participants regarding what 
improvements to water services they would most like to see, with no clear overall 
preference for personal or societal benefits. 
2. Participants, in general, are willing to accept modest additional water charges to improve 
specific services. 
3. People’s priorities for improvements are not changed substantially by learning about the 
costs and time horizons involved.  
4. Learning about costs and time horizons led some participants to deem a further small price 
rise acceptable. 
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1. Introduction 
Ideally, regulation of the water industry in Scotland will be informed by the best possible 
evidence regarding what Scottish people want from their water services. Yet how can we 
understand these preferences? The industry has been described as a ‘silent service’ (WICS, 
2017). Many people may have little knowledge of straightforward elements of their water 
system, such as the chances of service interruptions, or of more complex industry-level issues, 
such as the need for future investment. It is therefore possible that people’s views will be 
sensitive to the extent of their knowledge, so that as they learn more about the system their 
preferences change. This study presents a systematic experimental approach to this issue, 
focused on how the provision of information about the costs and benefits of improvements to 
water services affects households’ preferences regarding investment priorities. 
It is inevitably a challenge for any large utility to decide where to prioritise future investment. 
Citizens in Scotland do appear willing to engage with the water industry on these matters, and 
previous qualitative studies have demonstrated diverse opinions regarding the desired direction 
of future investment (e.g. Walker, 2017). However, it is very unlikely that households have a 
set of well-formed, stable preferences over water charges and systems; rather they “construct” 
their preferences as information and decisions are put in front of them. Controlled behavioural 
experiments are a good tool for investigating these issues, because the level and type of 
information provision can be experimentally controlled and tested. For example, experimental 
findings suggest that preferences for environmental services can differ when these are elicited 
as either choices between options or as independent valuations (e.g. Irwin et al., 1991). 
This is the second in a series of experimental research studies designed to illuminate the views 
of Scottish citizens regarding water. The first study (Belton et al., 2020) elicited attitudes to 
potential changes in water charges. The results revealed some tolerance for modest price rises 
in the short and medium term, as well as clear preferences for the trajectory of price changes 
across multiple years. However, these responses were obtained in the absence of any 
information about how the money might be spent or over what timescale any benefits might 
accrue. In principle, people’s willingness to pay might be altered substantially by knowing 
what they might get in return for their money. Sensitivity of preferences to information on costs 
and benefits of service improvements might arise for several reasons. People may be overly 
optimistic or pessimistic about the amount or speed of improvement associated with a given 
increase in charges, meaning that relevant information alters whether they view the return as 
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worth the increase. This could apply differentially across the range of potential improvements, 
with the potential for systematic overestimation or underestimation of improvements of a 
particular type. Willingness to pay may also be contingent on the money being used to address 
the specific improvements that an individual would like to see prioritised, which may vary 
substantially between different individuals.    
A primary aim of this study was to record Scottish citizen’s preferences when the trade-off 
between costs and benefits of additional investment were made explicit and, hence, respondents 
were forced to balance different improvements to the system both against each other and 
against their costs. An increase in investment for any given improvement may come from two 
possible strategies. Either the absolute level of investment within the industry must rise, or the 
share of investment directed towards the intended improvement must increase. In the latter 
case, investment must be taken away from another potential improvement. 
This study required a sample of Scottish citizens to consider these very sorts of trade-offs. 
Through a sequence of experimental stages, participants indicated which types of water service 
improvements they thought should be prioritised over others, and by how much. The available 
information about costs and timescales was carefully controlled at each stage and the 
experimental design allowed them to express their preferences using an interface via which 
they could vary both overall investment and its allocation across potential improvements.   
Previous survey research has provided some empirical insights into how individuals rank 
benefits in the Scottish water industry (Scottish Water, 2017), but these were elicited in the 
absence of information about what benefit might be obtained for a given increase or decrease 
in charges. By using the controlled behavioural experiments described here, the present study 
obtained measures of more informed household preferences, asking what people want when 
told what they can expect in return for their money, and when they can expect to see these 
benefits felt. There were four specific research questions: 
1) What are citizens’ general preferences for different specific service improvements? 
2) What would citizens deem to be an acceptable price rise for water charges to invest in 
specific service improvements? 
3) How does providing the costs of different specific service improvements alter the 
priorities and willingness-to-pay towards improvements of citizens? 
4) How does providing the time horizons of different specific service improvements alter 
the priorities and willingness-to-pay towards improvements of citizens? 
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In order to answer these specific research questions, this study implemented five distinct 
experimental stages. In addition, two more general research questions were addressed across 
multiple stages: (i) Is there a general preference for service benefits likely to affect the 
individual household directly (e.g., reduced likelihood of service interruption) as opposed to 
benefits accruing to society more generally (e.g., increasing the share of renewable energy)? 
(ii) Are there strong differences in responses across individuals? As there were theoretical, 
methodological and practical differences between each experimental stage, we report the 
motivation, design and results of each stage sequentially, in the order in which participants 
completed them. A general discussion of the main overall findings, and the potential policy 
implications of these, then follows. First, we outline the general design of the overall study. 
 
2. General Study Design 
This study was a computerised experiment that presented participants with a variety of tasks, 
aimed at eliciting different measures of their attitudes towards investment for improvements to 
the water sector in Scotland. As well as presenting participants with multiple tasks, the 
information about possible investment and improvements varied across different tasks, which 
all participants undertook (a within-subject design). In addition, for some aspects of the 
experiment, the exact information that participants saw differed across participants (a between-
subject design). 
A total of 599 Scottish citizens took part in this study. 500 completed it online, and 99 
completed it face-to-face in a mobile laboratory. In the online study, participants who were 
already signed up to an online market research company were invited to follow an email link 
on their personal computers to begin the experiment. The experiment itself took approximately 
20 minutes to complete, and participants received the industry standard participation fee 
determined by the market research company (approximately £2.00). In the face-to-face study, 
participants were recruited by a market research company to attend four locations in Scotland: 
Glasgow, Inverness, Aberdeen and Edinburgh. Participants attended the session for 
approximately 30 minutes in total and were paid £20 (approximately the standard fee for face-
to-face studies). 
The studies were identical across both platform types. The studies used the experimental 
platform Gorilla Experiment Builder (www.gorilla.sc). All instructions were identical, but 
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were read aloud by an instructor in the face-to-face studies. Efforts were made to match the 
demographic characteristics of participants across both platform types, and details of this can 
be found in Appendix H. Systematic differences in responses based on platform type would 
raise important methodological questions about the reliability of different study platforms in 
eliciting truthful or consistent responses in studies such as this. A comparison of results by 
platform type can be found in Appendix H. 
 
3. Stage 1 – Ranking Task 
Research Question: What are citizens’ general preferences for different specific service 
improvements? 
3.1. Introduction 
In the first stage, participants were provided with descriptions of seven possible water service 
issues that the Scottish water industry might want to prioritise investment towards to improve. 
The aim of this stage was to ascertain an initial sense of citizens’ priorities towards a wide array 
of potential service improvements that the Scottish water industry might choose to invest in. 
For each of the seven potential service issues, participants were given a description of the 
potential issue, as well as a potential improvement to the issue. Details of the descriptions 
provided for each issue can be found in Appendix A. It is important to note that, while the 
description of each service improvement was designed with input from the Scottish water 
industry, this was not a qualitative study that aimed to provide participants with detailed 
information about these issues. It remains possible that framing these descriptions in a different 
way might alter responses. The main aim of this stage was to generate a general inference of 
citizens’ attitudes to different water service issues, and to provide a benchmark from which 
comparisons could be made when these preferences were elicited again using different 
methodologies and in the presence of additional information about these service issues. 
Four of these potential improvements used in this stage were target improvements – which 
were to be used in the later stages of the experiment:  
1. Reducing the number of short term interruptions to supply (Interruptions to Supply) 
2. Reducing the number of external sewer flooding incidents (External Sewer Flooding) 
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3. Connecting rural supplies to the water system (Rural Supplies)1 
4. Increasing the share of renewable energy generated by the water industry (Renewable 
Energy) 
These four improvements were determined as most appropriate for two reasons. The first is 
that, whilst participants in this study were responding to specific improvements in the water 
industry, these decisions could be indicative of more general preferences of Scottish citizens. 
Two of these improvements were broadly personal improvements, where the improvement 
would directly affect water in or around the home, namely reducing interruptions to supply and 
external sewer flooding. The remaining two were more societal improvements, where for the 
vast majority of citizens, the benefits would not have a direct positive impact on them. 
Connecting rural supplies would not directly affect the vast majority of citizens. Increasing the 
proportion of renewable energy generated by the water industry would not have direct benefit 
to citizens either. Systematic preferences for one category of improvements over the other 
might indicate the level of pro-social attitudes of Scottish citizens with regards to the water 
industry. The second reason was that, for later stages in the study, approximations of real cost 
estimates for improvements were given to participants. The Scottish water industry was able 
to provide more confident estimates of these specific improvements than other potential 
improvements, making them more suitable for experimental manipulation.  
The remaining three improvements in this stage were other plausible water service 
improvements for the Scottish water industry: 
1. Reducing leakage in supply pipes (Supply Pipe Leakages) 
2. Improving drinking water look, taste and smell (Drinking Water Quality) 
3. Improving cleanliness of rivers, seas and beaches (Beach/ River Cleanliness) 
At this stage, participants were not aware which subset of improvements were defined as target 
improvements and would be used in the later stages of the study. After taking time to read the 
descriptions of each issue and its improvement participants were asked to rank the seven 
improvements in order of importance to them (where 1 = most important and 7 = least 
important). By asking participants to rank seven possible improvements, the results from this 
stage enabled a measure of the following: 
a) The absolute ranking of each target improvement relative to one another 
 
1 A small number (approximately 4%) of households in Scotland are not connected to the public water supply, 
but are instead connected to a private supply. These are predominantly found in rural areas. 
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b) How much participants care about the target improvements in general (relative to other 
improvements) 
3.2. Results 
The order in which the service descriptions and improvements were listed was randomised 
across participants. There was strong evidence of an order effect, where descriptions/ 
improvements viewed earlier were ranked as more important. As the order was randomised at 
the individual level this should not adversely affect the findings in later stages, because no one 
service improvement should have disproportionately benefitted from these order effects, but 
this is a potentially important methodological finding. Further details may be found in 
Appendix I. 
Table 1 below reports the average ranking of each of the seven possible improvements from 
most important to least important, as well as the likelihood any given improvement was to be 
ranked as 1st, 7th or 1st – 4th most important, by improvement and improvement type. It is also 
reports the rankings, and likelihood to be ranked 1st or 4th, of the four target improvements 
relative to one another. 
In general, there does not appear to be strong evidence of a systematically and substantially 
most (or least) important improvement. Overall, Beach/ River Cleanliness was perceived to be 
the most important improvement (3.24/7), as indicated by a lower average ranking score, and 
Interruptions to Supply least important (4.79/7). Appendix B reports pairwise tests of the 
medians of differences for each pair of improvements. This analyses reveals that participants 
were not significantly more likely to rank Beach/ River Cleanliness as more important than 
Supply Pipe Leakages in a pairwise comparison (p= 0.248), and nor were they significantly 
more likely to rank Interruptions to Supply as less important than Rural Supplies (p= 0.150). 
Drinking Water Quality was ranked “most important” (i.e. 1st) most frequently (20.2%), and 
Interruptions to Supply least frequently (7.3%). Renewable Energy was ranked “least 
important” (i.e. 7th) most frequently (23.5%) and Beach/ River Cleanliness least frequently 
(5.2%).  
On average, when pooling rankings by target improvements (4.40/7) and other improvements 
(3.47/7), the target improvements were ranked as less important. In addition, on average, any 
given target improvement was almost half as likely to be ranked as “most important” as the 
other improvements. Likewise, any given target improvement was ranked as one of the top four 
most important improvements almost 50% of the time on average. The same was true almost 
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70% of the time for any given other improvement on average. Among the four target 
improvements, External Sewer Flooding was ranked most important on average (2.11/4) and 
was ranked “most important” most frequently (for 33.9% of participants). 
 Overall Target Improvements 
 Average 
Ranking 
Proportion of 
Ranking 
Average 
Ranking 
Proportion of 
Ranking 
 ( / 7) 1st 7th 1st - 4th ( / 4) 1st 4th 
Beach/ River Cleanliness 3.24 19.2% 5.2% 73.0% ------- ------- ------- 
Supply Pipe Leakages 3.38 19.4% 5.5% 71.3% ------- ------- ------- 
External Sewer Flooding 3.74 12.9% 7.3% 65.1% 2.11 33.9% 10.4% 
Drinking Water Quality 3.80 20.2% 15.9% 60.3% ------- ------- ------- 
Renewable Energy 4.41 13.2% 23.5% 48.7% 2.50 28.4% 29.2% 
Rural Supplies 4.64 7.8% 20.5% 42.4% 2.64 18.9% 27.6% 
Interruptions to Supply 4.79 7.3% 22.0% 39.2% 2.74 18.9% 32.9% 
        
Target Improvements 4.40 10.3% 18.4% 48.9% ------- ------- ------- 
Other Improvements 3.47 19.6% 8.9% 68.2% ------- ------- ------- 
Table 1. Average ranking and likelihood to be ranked as 1st, 7th or 1st - 4th most important by 
improvement, from most important to least important (target improvements highlighted in 
bold) 
 
Histograms of the distributions of rankings can be found in Appendix C. Analysis of these 
distributions reveals evidence of a ‘U-shaped’ distribution for Renewable Energy and Drinking 
Water Quality – suggesting that these were more divisive improvements, as participants 
disproportionately ranked them as most or least important. Tests of equality of variance across 
improvements, found in Appendix C, offers some evidence in support of the claim that some 
improvements were more divisive than others. 
Because the importance each individual gave to the target improvements might have influenced 
their responses in the later stages of the study, we used the responses from Stage 1 to construct 
a relevant measure. Since the same four improvements were used as the target improvements 
for all participants, it is possible to sum the number of these target improvements that were 
ranked 1st – 4th most important for each participant. This provides a metric to be used as a proxy 
for the relative importance of these target improvements for each participant among the wider 
set of potential improvements. Table 2 reports the proportion of participants categorised by this 
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importance metric: the number of target improvements that were ranked 1st – 4th most 
important. 
Number of Target 
Improvements Ranked 1st – 4th 
1 2 3 4 
Number of Participants 136 355 107 1 
Percentage of Participants 22.7% 59.3% 17.9% 0.2% 
Table 2. Proportion of participants by number of target improvements ranked 1st – 4th most 
important 
 
It was necessarily true that at least one of the four target improvements had to be included in 
the 1st – 4th rankings, since there were only 3 other improvements. Of the 136 participants who 
only ranked one of the target improvements 1st – 4th most important, 51 (approximately 8.5% 
of all participants) ranked the other improvements as 1st – 3rd most important, implying that all 
four target improvements were overall ranked less important for these participants. Only 1 
participant ranked the four target improvements 1st – 4th most important. 
Taken together, the findings from Stage 1 imply that the target improvements were on average 
ranked less important than the other improvements. Amongst the target improvements, 
External Sewer Flooding was ranked on average as most important. Since the later stages 
involve a novel mechanism designed to elicit the trade-offs between investment in different 
services, the results from this stage may be used as a benchmark for consistency in the later 
stages. Parametric analysis of the Ranking task, incorporating demographic effects, can be 
found in Appendix D. 
It is also of interest to compare the results from this stage with the findings of the previous 
Scottish Water (2017) study, which asked citizens to rank similar service issues using a 
different methodology. Generally, there is reasonably high agreement between the results of 
the two studies. This study was not intended to be directly comparable to the 2017 study, and 
differences in the relative descriptions of the issues across the two studies may explain some 
disparities between the two sets of findings, as might the specific issues used. 
For example, perhaps the most striking difference is for Interruptions to Supply across the two 
studies. However, there were clear distinctions between the specific issues present across the 
two tasks that make direct comparisons inappropriate. For example, the issues ranked worse 
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than Short-Term Interruptions to Supply in the 2017 study were either not present in this 
present study or framed in such a way that might make them seem more important issues in 
this present study (e.g. the description of Beach/ River Cleanliness in this study refers explicitly 
to potential pollution issues, whereas in the 2017 study the issue was framed only in terms of 
the awarding of cleanliness ratings). 
 
4. Stage 2 – Basic Slider Task 
Research Question: What are citizens’ general preferences for different specific service 
improvements? 
4.1. Introduction 
In this stage, participants were asked to allocate an unknown level of investment between four 
of the improvements that they had just ranked in Stage 1. For each participant, the four 
improvements to be allocated investment in this stage were the same four target improvements 
from Stage 1. Participants were not provided a reason for why these improvements had been 
selected, and nor were they informed that all participants saw the same four improvements. 
Participants were able to indicate their desired allocation of the unknown investment using a 
series of sliders, one for each of the four improvements. Figure 1 below provides a screenshot 
of the Basic Slider task environment, as seen by participants. 
Figure 1. Example screenshot of the Basic Slider task environment 
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For each slider, participants could allocate 0% (which indicated that none of the investment 
would be spent on the improvement for that slider), 100% (which indicated that all of the 
investment would be spent on the improvement for that slider, and no investment would be 
spent on the other three improvements) or any percentage amount between 5% - 95%, in 5% 
increments. The total sum of the four slider allocations was required to equal 100%, and this 
total amount automatically updated on the participants’ screens as they adjusted each slider. 
The slider tools used in this study are a novel methodological design. Previous studies 
investigating citizen preferences for water services have commonly used a stated choice, or 
discrete choice, methodology (e.g. Hensher et al., 2005, Willis et al., 2005, Lanz and Provins, 
2015). In these previous experiments, participants were faced with different scenarios 
comprising different water service combinations and costs, and asked to choose which 
scenarios they would prefer. Well-designed combinations of scenarios combined with 
assumptions about the shape of individual preferences enable a quantification of the estimated 
value of each service. However, as these combinations of scenarios are presented arbitrarily to 
participants, the trade-off between different attributes, and costs, may be implicit for 
participants as they respond to each decision. The design of these sliders was intended to make 
salient the trade-offs required in investment decisions. For a fixed level of investment, a certain 
amount of improvements may be feasible. In order to invest more in one improvement, the 
amount of investment available to be spent on another improvement must be reduced. 
4.2. Results 
If participants had equal preference for all of the four improvements, the allocation should be 
25% for each improvement. In total, only 4.2% of participants indicated equal investment for 
all improvements. Only 0.5% of participants allocated 100% of investment to one 
improvement, and only 6.0% of participants allocated 0% to one (or more) improvement. The 
average difference between the highest and lowest allocation amount was 29.6 percentage 
points. In general, therefore, the setting of the sliders indicates that participants engaged 
positively with the task, providing a variety of investment allocations across all improvements. 
The order of presentation of improvements was randomised across participants, and there was 
no evidence of order influencing allocations in this task (details can be found in Appendix I). 
Figure 2 below reports the average allocation by improvement. On average, 28.7% was 
allocated to investment in External Sewer Flooding, 27.1% to Renewable Energy, 22.5% to 
Interruptions to Supply and 21.8% to Rural Supplies. 
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Figure 2. Average allocation by improvement in the Basic Slider task (error bars report 
standard errors) (blue colour coding denotes personal improvements, orange colour coding 
denotes societal improvements) 
 
Figure 3, below, pools responses by the two broad improvement categories, personal and 
societal. Overall, there is a very slight preference on average for personal improvements 
(51.1%) over societal improvements (48.9%). 20.2% of participants allocated 50% to each 
group. Of those who gave an unequal allocation, there was no statistically significant difference 
in the likelihood of allocating more to personal improvements (52.9%) or societal 
improvements (47.1%) (χ2= 1.640, p= 0.200)2. When comparing demographic effects on 
personal/ societal improvements, there is strong evidence of an age effect, with younger 
participants (i.e. those aged between 18-40) allocating significantly more to societal 
improvements than both participants aged 41-60 (p< 0.001) and those aged 61+ (p< 0.001). 
Additional details can be found in Appendix K. Whether this is reflective of younger citizens 
in general, suggesting that younger respondents will become less pro-social as they age, or 
whether this represents a cohort effect, where there has been a recent societal shift in attitudes, 
so that presently younger respondents will maintain their pro-social attitudes as they age, has 
potentially important implications from a policy perspective. In addition there were strong 
platform effects – with face-to-face respondents also allocating significantly more to societal 
 
2 There was also no significant difference between the allocation towards societal improvements among those 
participants who indicated that they are (45.6%) or are not (49.0%) connected to private water supplies (t= 
1.038, p= 0.300). 
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improvements that online respondents (p= 0.011). Additional details can be found in Appendix 
H. 
 
Figure 3. Average allocation by improvement groups the Basic Slider task (error bars report 
standard errors) 
 
The use of a slider task was a novel methodology to elicit the trade-off decisions of consumers 
for a given set of investment priorities. As such it is useful to compare the decisions made in 
this task with the decisions made in the more conventional Ranking task. Evidence of 
consistency in the relative priorities given to individual improvements would be an indication 
of a level of engagement with the slider task that is comparable with more conventional 
preference elicitation mechanisms. 
4.3. Basic Slider Task and Ranking Task Consistency 
It is important to compare responses between the Ranking task and Basic Slider task as a 
measure of consistency between the two task types. Figure 4 below compares the average 
allocation amounts based on the relative rankings of the target improvements in the Ranking 
task. The target improvement that was ranked highest relative to the remaining three was 
allocated on average 35.9% of investment in the Basic Slider task. The second highest was 
allocated on average 26.4% and the third highest was allocated on average 21.6%. The target 
improvement that was ranked lowest relative to the remaining three was allocated on average 
16.1% of investment in the Basic Slider task. Evidently, the higher a given target improvement 
was ranked relative to others, the higher the allocation it received in the Basic Slider task. 
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Participants revealed a remarkable degree of consistency between Ranking task decisions and 
Basic Slider task allocations. Since participants did not know that the four target improvements 
would be used in the later stages, such consistency would have been difficult to achieve through 
simple memory recall alone. This suggests that the decisions made in the Basic Slider task were 
reflective of genuine preferences, consistent with those elicited in the Ranking task. 
 
Figure 4. Average Basic Slider allocation by ranking in the Ranking task 
 
5. Stage 3 - Willingness-to-Pay Task 
Research Question: What would citizens deem to be an acceptable price rise for water 
charges to invest in specific service improvements? 
5.1. Introduction 
In this stage participants were asked the maximum they would be willing to increase their 
current water bill by if they knew that the additional revenue raised would be used to improve 
the target improvements from the previous stage. There was no indication of the cost of 
improving each possible improvement in this stage. In order to generate more realistic 
responses, participants were first asked the council tax band of the property they lived in. This 
enabled the experiment to calculate each participants’ actual annual water charge. Details of 
this can be found in Appendix J. 
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Participants were then returned to the basic slider screen, with an additional tool which enabled 
them to indicate the maximum amount they would be willing to add to their water charge. A 
screenshot of the tool is provided below in Figure 5. Participants could increase their water 
charge in £1 increments, or they could choose to add nothing to their water charge. Participants 
were informed that they were not able to reduce their water charge to less than its current level. 
The participants’ new annual water charge (accounting for any increases) updated every time 
the participant used the tool, in nominal terms (i.e. not accounting for inflation). It was 
explained to participants that this represented a one-off price rise which would determine their 
new annual water charge. Previous research has shown that consumers may be averse to price 
rises, particularly if they perceive them to be unfair (Kahneman et al., 1986). 
 
Figure 5. Screenshot of the willingness-to-pay tool used in Stage 3 
 
The investment allocations participants had provided in the Basic Slider task were fixed in this 
stage, but every time the participant altered the willingness-to-pay tool, the monetary amount 
to be directed to each of the four improvements (in accordance with the allocation decisions of 
the Basic Slider task) were updated. For example, if a participant allocated 40% of investment 
to one improvement in the Basic Slider task, and indicated a willingness-to-pay an additional 
£10 on their water charge in this stage, then they were informed that £4.00 would be invested 
in that improvement. 
It is important to acknowledge that the main aim of this stage was to provide a benchmark 
willingness-to-pay from which comparisons could be made when additional information (such 
as specific improvement costs and time horizons) was made available to the same group of 
individuals. This was not a controlled willingness-to-pay task aimed at explicitly eliciting the 
exact valuations of citizens. It is argued that open-ended questions such as the one used in this 
study may be less reliable than closed questions (i.e. “would you be willing to pay X?”) (e.g. 
Arrow et al., 1993). However this would have made the dynamic design of later stages 
impractical, and since it was the relative changes in willingness-to-pay across stages that was 
a key outcome variable, this open-ended style question was deemed most appropriate. 
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5.2. Results 
On average, participants indicated a willingness to pay an additional £11.03 (SD: 17.94) on 
their water charges, if this additional investment was to be spent in improving the four target 
improvements. Once accounting for current annual charges of each participant, this represents 
a willingness to increase water charges by 2.5% on average. However, 40.1% of participants 
indicated a willingness-to-pay of £0, suggesting that they would not be willing to add any 
additional amount to their water charge. Amongst those who were willing to pay something, 
average willingness-to-pay was £18.41 (SD: 20.03), a 4.2% increase on average. 
As is common with findings of willingness-to-pay, especially for non-market goods, the 
responses were strongly right-skewed (i.e. lots of lower values and fewer very high values).  
9.2% of responses indicated a willingness-to-pay of greater than £30, with one participant 
indicating a willingness-to-pay of £200. An analysis of the distributions of willingness-to-pay 
responses can be found in Table 3 below. 
 All 
 (n) (%) 
£0 240 40.1% 
£1 - £5 97 16.2% 
£6 - £10 74 12.4% 
£11 - £20 95 15.9% 
£21 - £30 38 6.3% 
£31 - £40 14 2.3% 
£41 - £50 17 2.8% 
£51 - £75 20 3.3% 
£76 + 4 0.7% 
Table 3. Distribution of willingness-to-pay responses 
 
Although the very high responses are outliers relative to the overall population of responses, 
this required extensive use of the willingness-to-pay tool (since it only increased in £1 
increments), and so these responses could not have been made through erroneous use of the 
tool. It is possible that responses in this task are a conservative estimate of participants’ true 
preferences, if they became disinterested with engaging with the willingness-to-pay tool (where 
greater increases necessarily required greater effort). Additionally, framing each incremental 
price rise as a £1 increase might have signalled a lower expected price rise than if each unit 
increase was of a greater increment. In light of this it bears repeating that this stage aimed to 
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provide an approximated baseline willingness-to-pay from which later willingness-to-pay 
decisions (in the presence of additional information) could be compared. 
Parametric analyses of all Willingness-to-Pay tasks in this experiment can be found in 
Appendix G. Significant differences in willingness-to-pay were found across experimental 
platform. In face-to-face studies the amount that participants were willing to add to their water 
charge was over double that of those in online studies (additional details can be found in 
Appendix H). 
It is possible that overall willingness-to-pay was influenced by a general attitude towards the 
target improvements. If the amount that citizens were willing to pay was influenced by how 
much they liked the improvements that were to be invested in, then this suggests that what 
participants are willing to pay for improvement depends on which improvements are to be 
invested in.  Figure 6 below reports the willingness-to-pay of participants separated by how 
many target improvements were ranked within the top four of the Ranking task for each 
participant. 
In general there appears evidence of an increasing trend of willingness-to-pay with increasing 
number of target improvements ranked within the top four of the Ranking task. Only one 
participant ranked the four target improvements as their top four most important in the Ranking 
task, so these were omitted from analysis (this participant provided a willingness-to-pay of £0). 
On average, those with one target improvement ranked in the top four were willing to pay 
£7.57, significantly less than those with two, (£11.74) (t= 2.605, p= 0.010), and significantly 
less than those with three (£13.20) (t= 2.194, p= 0.029). There was no significant difference 
between two and three (t= 0.705, p= 0.481). 
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Figure 6. Willingness-to-pay by number of target improvements ranked 1st – 4th in the Ranking 
task 
 
6. Stage 4 – Cost Revelation Task 
Research Question: How does providing the costs of different specific service improvements 
alter the priorities and willingness-to-pay towards improvements of citizens? 
6.1. Introduction 
In the previous stages, participants were not provided with any explicit information about the 
approximate costs of each improvement or the extent of the benefit that might be expected in 
return. This stage aimed to measure if, and how, participants would alter their preferences in 
the light of information about the different costs of different improvements. Preferences might 
change in two ways. First, knowing the absolute costs of improvements could influence the 
total willingness-to-pay of participants. Second, knowing the relative costs of improvements 
could influence the allocations provided to each improvement. 
The task in this stage was a combination of both the Basic Slider task and the Willingness-to-
Pay task. Participants were shown the same user interface as in these previous stages, but were 
also provided the unit cost of each improvement. The unit cost was presented as the cost per 
household to increase one unit of improvement if every household in Scotland were to pay that 
additional cost. Calculations of these costs were agreed in advance with stakeholders in the 
Scottish water industry and were broad approximations of the true costs of these improvements. 
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They were the same for all participants. The unit measure of improvement and its cost, for each 
improvement, are presented in Table 4 below. 
Improvement Cost Unit Measure 
Interruptions to Supply 2.5p Reduce one incident of short term interruption to 
supply 
 
External Sewer Flooding 10p Reduce one external sewer flooding incident 
 
 
Rural Supply 5p Connect one rural home to public water system 
 
 
Renewable Energy 50p Generate one additional GWh of energy from 
renewable sources (where 1 GWh is equivalent to 
the annual electricity usage in 300 homes) 
Table 4. Unit measure of improvement and corresponding cost for each improvement 
 
In this stage, participants were asked to do two things: 
1. Indicate the allocation of investment given to each improvement (as with the Basic 
Slider task) 
2. Indicate their willingness-to-pay additional water charges (as with the Willingness-to-
Pay task) 
The sliders for each improvement were reset to 0% (therefore participants had to re-allocate 
the investment – there was no indication of the allocation they had provided in the Basic Slider 
task). The annual water charge was maintained at the level that was set in the Willingness-to-
Pay task, but participants were able to increase or decrease this (but still could not decrease this 
to below their existing real annual water charge). 
For each improvement, participants were also informed of how many units would be improved 
based on their total willingness-to-pay and their allocation to each investment. For example, if 
a participant allocated 40% to Renewable Energy improvements, and was willing to add £10 
to their water charge (i.e. £4 to be spent on this improvement), they would be informed that 
this would allow an additional 8 GWh of energy generated by the Scottish water industry to be 
generated from renewable sources. These calculations updated on the participants’ screens 
22 
 
every time they adjusted a slider or the willingness-to-pay tool. Participants were encouraged 
to adjust these until they were happy with both their allocation and their willingness-to-pay. 
6.2. Results 
6.2.1. Slider Task 
Figure 7 below reports the average allocations for each improvement in the Cost Revelation 
task. Comparing responses to allocations in the Cost Revelation task with the Basic Slider task 
reveals that 25.7% of participants provided the same allocations for all improvements in both 
tasks. For all improvements, between 84.6% - 88.3% of all allocations in this task were within 
10 percentage points (either greater than or less than) of the allocation for the equivalent 
improvement in the Basic Slider task. 
 
Figure 7. Average allocation by improvement in the Cost Revelation task (error bars report 
standard errors) 
 
Figure 8 below reports the average difference in allocation for each improvement between the 
Basic Slider task and the Cost Revelation task. On average, the changes in allocation follow a 
pattern that would be expected if participants were readjusting allocations according to cost. 
However, the magnitude of these differences is small, and none of the differences in allocation 
amounts between tasks were statistically significant. The cheapest per unit improvement, 
Interruptions to Supply was allocated 0.7 percentage points more in the Cost Revelation task 
(t= 1.592, p= 0.112), and the second cheapest improvement, Rural Supplies was allocated 0.1 
percentage points more in the Cost Revelation task (t= 0.282, p= 0.778). The third cheapest 
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improvement, External Sewer Flooding was allocated 0.3 percentage points less in the Cost 
Revelation task (t= -0.569, p= 0.570), and the most expensive improvement, Renewable 
Energy, was allocated 0.5 percentage points less in the Cost Revelation task (t= -1.118, p= 
0.264). However, the lack of statistically significant differences in allocations indicates that 
there is little evidence to suggest that participants’ perceptions of investment prioritisation was 
strongly influenced by the relative costs of different improvements. Parametric analyses of the 
differences in allocation across the Basic Slider and Cost Revelation task may be found in 
Appendix E. 
 
Figure 8. Difference in average allocation by improvement between Cost Revelation task and 
Basic Slider task 
 
6.2.2. Willingness-to-Pay Task 
In addition to adjusting the sliders, participants were also able to readjust their willingness-to-
pay additional water charges in light of the cost revelation in this task. 84.1% of participants 
did not adjust their water charge between tasks. 1.2 % of participants reduced their water charge 
when the cost of improvements was revealed, and 14.7% of participants increased their water 
charge when the cost of improvements was revealed. 
Overall, participants in this task were willing to pay an additional £12.09 (SD: 19.54), an 
increase of £1.06. The difference in willingness-to-pay between Stage 3 and Stage 4 was 
statistically significant (t= 4.787, p< 0.001).  Thus, when participants were shown the cost of 
improvements, this significantly increased the additional water charge they were willing to 
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tolerate, albeit that the effect was driven by a minority of individuals. Parametric analyses of 
all Willingness-to-Pay tasks in this experiment can be found in Appendix G. 
This finding may have been connected to the way in which the costs of improvements were 
framed. By decomposing costs to the cost per household as opposed to the overall cost per unit 
increase, the additional cost per unit of improvement for each household appeared very small, 
and every additional £1 added to an individual’s water charge was aggregated for all 
households in Scotland. This aimed to remove the temptation for any given participant to free-
ride (i.e. refusing to tolerate a price increase in the hope that others would agree to an increase 
in their annual water charge). However, it is possible that framing the cost of improvements 
differently (for example in terms of absolute cost), might have generated different responses. 
 
7. Stage 5 – Time Horizon Task 
Research Question: How does providing the time horizons of different specific service 
improvements alter the priorities and willingness-to-pay towards improvements of citizens? 
7.1. Introduction 
In the previous stages, participants were not provided with any information about the length of 
time it may take for the benefits of each improvement to be realised. This stage aimed to 
measure if, and how, participants would alter their preferences in light of information about the 
differences in the time it would take for the benefits of different improvements to be felt. 
The Time Horizon task was very similar to the Cost Revelation task. It was a combination of 
both the Basic Slider task and the Willingness-to-Pay task. In addition to the unit cost 
information provided in the Cost Revelation task, in this task participants were also informed 
of the estimated length of time it would take for the benefits of each improvement to be felt. 
Research into time discounting suggests that individuals give less weight to future events than 
immediate ones (Laibson, 1997). For example, one study found that individuals would accept 
a reward now that was four times smaller than a reward given in a years’ time (Thaler, 1981). 
In this stage the time horizons were manipulated in a between-subject design – that is, each 
participant saw only one version of time horizons, and this differed across participants. 
Intuitively, some of the specific improvements would feasibly take longer to improve than 
others. Because of this, the time horizons were not purely randomised across all improvements. 
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Two shorter time horizons were randomly assigned to Interruptions to Supply and External 
Sewer Flooding, and two longer time horizons were randomly assigned to Rural Supplies and 
Renewable Energy. The four time horizons were “Immediately”, “5 Years”, “10 Years” and 
“25 Years”. These were determined in light of existing literature on time discounting of 
individuals. Although the time difference between “Immediately” and “5 Years”, and “5 
Years” and “10 Years” is identical, research suggests that attitudes across the two pairs of time 
horizons may not be equivalent. In addition, many improvements in the water industry may be 
inter-generational. A time horizon of “25 Years” aimed to elicit attitudes towards 
improvements which may be most benefitted by future generations of citizens. In total, there 
were four unique combinations of time horizons for improvements. These four options, one of 
which each participant was randomly assigned, are illustrated in Table 5, below. 
Improvement Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4 
Interruptions to Supply Immediately 5 Years Immediately 5 Years 
 
External Sewer Flooding 5 Years Immediately 5 Years Immediately 
 
Rural Supplies 10 Years 10 Years 25 Years 25 Years 
 
Renewable Energy 25 Years 25 Years 10 Years 10 Years 
 
Table 5. List of all combinations of time horizon options 
 
As in the Cost Revelation task, the sliders for each improvement were reset to 0% and the 
annual water charge was maintained at the level that was set in the Cost Revelation task, but 
participants were able to increase or decrease this (but still could not decrease this to below 
their existing real annual water charge). 
7.2. Results 
7.2.1. Slider Task 
Since the time horizon of specific improvements differed across participants in this task, 
comparisons of allocations by time horizon must be made against the equivalent improvement 
in the Cost Revelation task for each participant. For example, if we were interested in the effect 
of the “5 Years” time horizon on responses, the allocation of all participants for whom 
Interruptions to Supply was given a “5 Years” time horizon would be compared with their 
allocation to Interruptions to Supply in the Cost Revelation task. Similarly the allocation of all 
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participants for whom External Sewer Flooding was given a “5 Years” time horizon would be 
compared with their allocation to External Sewer Flooding in the Cost Revelation task. Figure 
9 below outlines the average allocation in the Time Horizon task by different time horizons. 
 
Figure 9. Average allocation by time horizon in the Time Horizon task (error bars report 
standard errors) 
 
For an accurate comparison of the effect of revelation of time horizon, we compare the 
allocations to improvements in the Time Horizon task with the equivalent improvement in the 
Cost Revelation task for each participant. 31.6% of participants provided the same allocations 
for all improvements in both tasks. For all improvements, between 88.0% - 89.7% of all 
allocations in this task were within 10 percentage points (either greater than or less than) of the 
allocation for the equivalent improvement in the Cost Revelation task. 
Figure 10 below reports the average difference in allocation for each equivalent improvement 
between the Cost Revelation task and the Time Horizon task. There is evidence of statistically 
significant allocation change when time horizons are revealed to participants. For 
improvements that were to be improved “Immediately”, allocations increased by 1.4 
percentage points in the Time Horizon task (t= 3.311, p= 0.001). For improvements that were 
to be improved in “5 Years”, allocations decreased by 0.9 percentage points in the Time 
Horizon task (t= -2.412, p= 0.016). For improvements that were to be improved in “10 Years”, 
allocations decreased by 0.1 percentage points in the Time Horizon task, but this decrease was 
not statistically significant (t= -0.263, p= 0.793). For improvements that were to be improved 
in “25 Years”, allocations decreased by 0.4 percentage points in the Time Horizon task, but 
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this decrease was not statistically significant (t= -1.137, p= 0.256). Parametric analyses of the 
differences in allocation across the Cost Revelation and Time Horizon task may be found in 
Appendix F. 
 
Figure 10. Difference in average allocation by equivalent improvement between Time Horizon 
task and Cost Revelation task 
 
Existing research on time-discounting suggests that individuals may have a preference for more 
immediate rewards. The finding of increased allocation towards “Immediately” improvements 
supports this. What makes this slider design novel in the context of forcing decision trade-offs 
is that in order for participants to indicate a preference for “Immediately”, this must be offset 
by a reduction in allocation elsewhere. 
If time-discounting was a linear process, one might expect this to be disproportionately taken 
from the later time horizons instead. Theories of hyperbolic discounting suggest that 
discounting is not linear, but occurs more sharply for earlier delays and more slowly as the time 
delay increases. Depending on the slope of the hyperbolic discount function, the time durations 
of 5/10/25 years in the future may be expected to be more or less weighted by each individual. 
Whilst there was a significant increase in the allocation towards the “Immediately” time 
horizons, when comparing the average decreases across the three later time horizons, there 
were no statistically significant differences between “5 Years” and “10 Years” (t= -1.228, p= 
0.220), “5 Years” and “25 Years” (t= -0.806, p= 0.421) or “10 Years” and “25 Years” (t= 0.484, 
p= 0.629). This suggests that citizens appear to disproportionately care about the more 
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immediate future, but do not discern between medium and long-term improvements (i.e. 
5/10/25 years in the future). 
7.2.2. Willingness-to-Pay Task 
As in the Cost Revelation task, participants were able to adjust both the sliders and their 
willingness-to-pay additional costs to their annual water charge in this task. 91.2% of 
participants did not change their willingness-to-pay between the Cost Revelation and Time 
Horizon tasks, 7.5% increased their willingness-to-pay once the time for improvements to be 
felt were revealed, and only 1.3% of participants reduced their willingness-to-pay with this 
information. Overall, participants in this task were willing to pay an additional £12.57 (SD: 
19.99) on their annual water charge. This represents a £0.47 increase compared to the Cost 
Revelation task, a statistically significant increase (t= 3.657, p< 0.001). Parametric analyses of 
all Willingness-to-Pay tasks in this experiment can be found in Appendix G. 
 
8. Summary of Findings 
This experimental study aimed to better understand the preferences of Scottish citizens with 
regards to their priorities for future investment in the Scottish water industry. Through multiple 
stages we utilised a novel experimental methodology to elicit the attitudes of citizens regarding 
the importance of different service improvements, the degree to which future investment for 
specific service improvements should be prioritised, and how much should be spent to improve 
these services. We found evidence that the type of information provided influences attitudes to 
investment priorities and amounts. In this section we summarise the key results, and discuss 
potential underlying psychological mechanisms driving these responses. 
The findings of this study can be summarised as five key results: 
1. There is substantial variation in the preferences of participants. Whilst there is 
evidence of some systematic preferences across stages, at the individual level a variety 
of preferences for water improvements are reported. No one (or multiple) service 
improvements were consistently and substantially preferred to others in a systematic 
way across all participants across stages. However, at the individual level, these 
responses were consistent across stages (in particular across the Ranking task and Basic 
Slider task), suggesting that these preferences were not borne of random decision-
making or disinterest of participants; rather participants appeared to be engaged in the 
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study but simply assigned a broad array of preferences towards different water 
improvements. 
2. Participants in general are willing to pay additional water charges to improve 
specific services. Almost 60% of participants were willing to pay extra on their current 
annual water charges to improve the target improvements, without any information 
about specific costs or time horizons. Across all participants this amounted to £11.03 
extra, a 2.5% increase in their current annual water charges over the next 12 months. 
This is a higher proportion of participants and a larger increase than recorded by a 
somewhat different method in Stage 1 of Belton et al. (2020). In that study, we elicited 
the short run priors of what constituted a reasonable price change over the next 12 month 
period, with no indication of how any additional funds would be spent. Unlike in the 
present study, participants could opt for a price fall. Excluding those who did (for 
comparability), the average acceptable price rise in Stage 1 of Belton et al. (2020) was 
calculated as approximately £2.47 (or £5.27 excluding also those who selected “No 
change”)3. The disparity between the two studies, both in proportion opting for an 
increase and size of increase, suggests that providing information about how and where 
additional investment is to be spent may increase willingness-to-pay. Some caution is 
warranted, as the different responses could in part be due to the somewhat different 
questions asked. However, combining the results of both studies indicates a potential 
willingness to consider modest increases in charges, perhaps especially among those 
with better information. This difference between the two measures is also consistent 
with the more general behavioural tendency to prefer options that are concrete or 
familiar over options that are uncertain or unknown. On the assumption that learning 
about the possible benefits improved participant understanding, it can also be argued 
that the present results are more likely to reflect true underlying preferences (Beshears 
et al., 2008). 
3. Additional information about specific improvement costs and time horizons led to 
increased willingness-to-pay additional water charges. Willingness-to-pay increased 
by approximately £1.06 when information about the specific costs of service 
improvements was provided. However this was driven by only 14.7% of participants 
 
3 Stage 1 of Belton et al. (2020) was a multiple choice question of “Which of the following options do you 
believe to be the most acceptable price change for water charges over the next year?”. Participants were able to 
select a response option between the ranges of “Decrease by £5.01 - £10.00” to “Increase by £15.01 - £20.00”. 
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who increased their willingness-to-pay between tasks. The large majority, 84.1%, did 
not change their willingness-to-pay when provided with specific cost information and 
1.2% reduced it. This suggests that, when citizens are told how much improvement can 
be made from their increased water charges, they are on average willing to pay more 
towards these improvements – although the effect is not large. The costs may appear 
cheaper than some citizens would have anticipated. The cost information in this study 
was presented at a per-household level (i.e. the cost to increase one unit of improvement 
if every household in Scotland were to pay that additional cost). This meant, for any 
additional £1 indicated by the participant, multiple improvements could be made. The 
framing of costs in this way was a fundamental aspect of the slider task design. It is 
possible that if these costs were framed differently, for example as larger, absolute unit 
costs, then participants’ willingness to increase their water charges may have differed. 
Willingness-to-pay also increased again but to a lesser extent (£0.47) when participants 
were given information about the length of time it would take for improvements to be 
felt. It is possible that the time horizons provided were shorter than some participants 
might have anticipated, although they ranged from zero to 25 years away and were not 
based on specific estimates from the Scottish water industry. These findings may also 
be related to the general behavioural tendency to prefer things that are more familiar or 
concrete as suggested above – where increased learning about the costs and time 
horizons of improvements led to a preference (i.e. higher willingness-to-pay) when 
compared to willingness-to-pay without this information. 
4. Citizens have a preference for more immediate improvements. In the Time Horizon 
task, participants allocated significantly more to the improvement whose benefits could 
be felt “Immediately”. In isolation, this finding is perhaps to be expected. What was 
more surprising, however, was that we recorded no substantial differentiation in 
preferences between time periods of “5 Years”, “10 Years” and “25 Years” in the future. 
This suggests that citizens perceive more immediate time horizons to be more important, 
but do not distinguish between increasing future time horizons. In general, however, the 
differences between the time horizons were quite small. It is possible that the design 
underestimated the effect of time horizons. The behavioural phenomenon of anchoring 
(e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) may have contributed if people anchored their 
allocations in later slider tasks to their earlier allocation decisions or, perhaps, wanted 
to appear consistent in their decisions. We attempted to reduce this by resetting every 
slider to 0% in each slider task, but it is reasonable to assume that participants could 
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remember (with some potential scope for error) their allocations across the sliders in the 
previous task. Nevertheless, we recorded only a relatively weak preference for earlier 
realisation of benefits and it may be that citizens are willing to take a long-term view of 
returns to investment in a resource like water. 
5.  The experimental platform used can influence responses. A more general finding of 
this study was of differences in the responses of online and face-to-face participants. 
This was observed in both the slider tasks and the willingness-to-pay task. In the slider 
tasks, face-to-face participants indicated a preference to allocate more to societal 
improvements, whereas online respondents indicated a preference to allocate more to 
personal improvements. In the willingness-to-pay task, face-to-face respondents were 
willing to increase their annual water charge by approximately double that of online 
respondents. It is possible that the types of people who are incentivised to attend face-
to-face sessions are systematically different to those who complete online studies (even 
after controlling for observable demographic differences), but this is conjecture. 
Nevertheless, these findings support those of Belton et al. (2020) which indicate that 
running the same experiment on different platforms can lead to systematic differences 
in responses by platform type. 
 
9. Policy Implications 
This final section considers the implications of this second study in the experimental research 
series, designed to provide behavioural evidence to inform regulation of the Scottish water 
industry. The results build on and extend those obtained in Belton et al. (2020).  
Although the evidence base concerning household preferences for water services is growing, 
it is important to bear in mind that much remains to be investigated. In particular, while the 
present study elicited preferences for different improvements after participants were informed 
of the costs and benefits involved, it did so without communicating information on baseline 
levels of service and associated risks. For instance, a relative preference for investment 
designed to reduce interruptions to supply might be altered by knowing the probability of such 
an interruption; the preference for cleaner beach and river water may be changed by 
understanding current levels of pollution, and so on. Thus, inferences made from the present 
findings need to be drawn cautiously, in the knowledge that additional relevant empirical 
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evidence is likely to emerge as this research programme progresses and other results come to 
light. Nevertheless, the results have implications that warrant consideration.  
It is important when considering this study to see the wood as well as the trees. The pattern of 
individual preferences for specific improvements varied greatly and participants generally 
allocated substantially more funds to their favoured improvement. Yet although statistically 
significant differences were recorded, the average effects – aggregated preferences – across the 
seven improvements (and indeed four target improvements) were not very strong. The 
relatively modest gap in average ranking (out of seven) between the highest and lowest priority 
improvement (3.24 versus 4.79) in the Ranking task and the fact that the aggregate investment 
allocations to the four target improvements lay within a narrow band in the Basic Slider task 
(21.8-28.7%), indicates a lack of consistent and strong aggregate preferences, at least for the 
improvements tested here based on the descriptions provided. It is important to recall that this 
was not due to lack of engagement with the task or a bias towards equal allocation, given that 
the majority of participants in the allocation task opted for a highly unequal allocation, 
suggesting a strong individual preference for some improvements over others. Rather, because 
different respondents had different priorities the outcome was a relatively even aggregate 
allocation. Note that this might not have been the case. A strong aggregate preference could 
easily have emerged from the study design, at any of the stages as new information was 
communicated. An aggregate preference could have clearly favoured one particular 
improvement or one type (personal, societal, environmental, etc.). That this did not occur is 
telling. Moreover, throughout the study we found no consistent preference for improvements 
that generated individual benefits over those that generated societal benefits, at the population 
level. From a policy perspective, this plurality and balance of views across different households 
is important to recognise. This is a straightforward and potentially important finding in the 
context of a regulatory system that, in part, aims to respond to the preferences of Scottish 
households.    
That said, improvements to beach/river cleanliness and reductions in supply leakages were the 
biggest priorities of this representative sample of Scottish citizens. It is interesting that both of 
these improvements have an environmental dimension, although other environmental benefits 
were not ranked so highly. Also notable is the fact that the four highest ranked improvements 
all featured some visible component (e.g. water/sewage flooding, visible pollution or change 
in water appearance). It is possible the findings reflect a preference for improvements that can 
be observed. 
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Neither participants’ individual responses nor the relatively even aggregate allocation of 
investment were strongly disrupted by providing information about the costs and benefits of 
the four target improvements. This result might be interpreted as an indication that the scales 
of the costs and benefits came as no surprise to participants. Alternatively, participants may 
have viewed their relative allocation as more than a merely transactional process of investing 
money for a return, but also as one that gave a signal about priorities. Either way, the relatively 
even preferences recorded across the four target improvements were robust to providing 
information about costs and benefits.  
Making the costs and benefits of different improvements explicit did generate an aggregate 
increase in willingness to pay, via increased water charges. This was also not a foregone 
conclusion. Participants could instead have been disappointed when they discovered what they 
would get in return for their money and expressed this disappointment through a stronger 
preference for a zero increase. The response required an active decision to express a preference 
for an increase in charges and 60% of participants opted to do so (the remaining 40% indicated 
a desire for no increase, as there was no option to signal a desire for a decrease in charges). 
Broadly, the findings support those of Stage 1 in Belton et al. (2020), obtained via a different 
method, although willingness-to-pay in Study 2 was estimated to be somewhat greater. Thus, 
while the evidence records variation, both studies suggests that at the aggregate level there is 
some willingness among Scottish households to accept modest increases in charges. Explicit 
information in relation to what can be expected in return does not undermine this willingness 
and may in fact increase it.  
The present study also varied the stated timescale over which benefits would come to fruition. 
Unsurprisingly, given existing evidence on time discounting, people expressed a preference for 
immediate benefits over delayed ones. While important to note, this effect was relatively small 
and accompanied by the perhaps more surprising finding that there was almost no difference 
in preference between benefits that would be felt over 5, 10 or 25 years. Arguably, this result 
is consistent with that relating to personal and societal improvements – if the improvement is 
mainly to be felt by others, how much does it matter whether it is others now or others later? 
The scale of time discounting we recorded was less than the steep discounting typically seen 
in behavioural studies in which individuals trade off immediate against future outcomes. It is 
possible that this outcome was related to the innovative slider method employed, which made 
the trade-off involved unavoidable. But it is also possible that the shallow time discounting 
recorded reflects an underlying recognition that the nation’s water system needs to be reliable 
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and sustainable across decades and generations. Thus, this finding is suggestive and might 
reflect a potential willingness to entertain investment in water services over long time horizons, 
but further research is required before such a conclusion might be regarded as solid.     
Finally, the present study found some systematic differences in preferences between young and 
old people, most notably in respect of the desire for priority to be given to societal 
improvements. This raises an issue in relation to the faithful representation of citizens’ 
preferences in decisions about the future of the industry. It is impossible to determine whether 
the difference is an effect of age or cohort, i.e., whether these pro-social preferences will 
weaken with age or whether the current generation of young people possesses stronger pro-
social preferences that will persist. To the extent that the results reflect cohort rather than age, 
they raise an issue of intergenerational fairness. It is reasonable to ask whether equal weight 
should be accorded to the differing preferences of older and younger people when the latter 
will, ultimately, be more affected by long-term investment decisions taken at the present time. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A – Description of Service Improvements 
Below is a list of the descriptions of service issues and corresponding potential improvements 
that participants were shown prior to the Ranking task. 
Target Improvements 
Short term interruptions to supply 
- Water supply to homes is occasionally interrupted unexpectedly. This means that a property 
would be without water for a period of time. 
- A short term interruption is classed as between 6-12 hours duration. 
- This can affect daily routine in various ways e.g. the toilet cannot be flushed, there is no 
water in the tap, the shower cannot be used, for the duration of the 6-12 hour period. 
Possible Improvement - Reducing the number of short term interruptions to supply 
 
External sewer flooding incidents 
- On occasion sewers do not have capacity to cope with the amount of water they need to 
carry and sewage can spill out of the system, leading to external sewer flooding. 
- External sewer flooding means not being able to access your property, or any land on your 
property, without stepping through sewage flooding. 
- This can include detached garages and outhouses, and also roads near your home or 
community areas. 
Possible Improvement - Reducing the number of external sewer flooding incidents 
 
Rural supplies to the water system 
- A number of homes in remote areas currently have no access to the public Scottish water 
supply. 
- These homes have to rely on their own private supply. 
- Private supplies may be less reliable and of lower quality than publicly supplied water, and 
this may sometimes represent a health risk. 
Possible Improvement - Connecting rural supplies to the water system 
 
Non-renewable energy usage 
- Powering the Scottish water supply requires substantial energy usage. 
- Energy production from fossil fuels is a source of greenhouse gas emissions that contribute 
to climate change. 
- Generating this energy from renewable sources instead can reduce the amount of 
greenhouse gases generated by the Scottish water supply. 
Possible Improvement - Increasing share of renewable energy 
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Other Improvements 
Leakage in supply pipes 
- On occasion leakage in supply pipes can lead to water that is supposed to be supplied to 
properties being wasted. 
- High levels of leakage may reduce the reliability of water supply. 
- It may also result in visible water leakages rising to the surface in affected areas. 
Possible Improvement - Reducing leakage in supply pipes 
 
Drinking water look, taste and smell 
- In older water mains pipes, some natural chemicals in water may leave deposits, leading to 
changes in colour or sediment in water in the home. 
- Some chemicals used to keep water clean may interact with other natural chemicals in water 
and cause a different taste or smell to water. 
- These effects are not harmful, but may make water look, taste, or smell different. 
Possible Improvement - Improving drinking water look, taste and smell 
 
Cleanliness of rivers, seas and beaches 
- Many sewer networks are designed to spill some sewerage into rivers and seas. 
- When operating properly these occasional discharges cause little risk to the environment. 
- If a sewer capacity is too small, or the network is not operating properly, these discharges 
can impact water environmental quality or lead to visible pollution in rivers, seas and on 
beaches. 
Possible Improvement - Improving cleanliness of rivers, seas and beaches 
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Appendix B – Wilcoxon sign-rank tests for pairwise comparisons of improvements 
 
 Supply Pipe 
Leakages 
External 
Sewer 
Flooding 
Drinking 
Water 
Quality 
Renewable 
Energy 
Rural 
Supplies 
Interruptions 
to Supply 
Beach/ River 
Cleanliness 
52.3% 
z= 1.156 
p= 0.248 
56.8% 
z= 4.322 
p< 0.001 
54.6% 
z= 4.291 
p< 0.001 
68.8% 
z= 10.208 
p< 0.001 
72.5% 
z= 10.718 
p< 0.001 
70.8% 
z= 11.401 
p< 0.001 
 Supply Pipe 
Leakages 
 
56.6% 
z= 3.500 
p< 0.001 
54.1% 
z= 3.279 
p= 0.001 
63.4% 
z= 7.758 
p< 0.001 
68.1% 
z= 9.989 
p< 0.001 
72.5% 
z= 11.240 
p< 0.001 
  External 
Sewer 
Flooding 
50.6% 
z= 0.457 
p= 0.648 
59.9% 
z= 5.225 
p< 0.001 
61.1% 
z= 7.819 
p<0.001 
68.1% 
z= 8.782 
p< 0.001 
   Drinking 
Water 
Quality 
57.9% 
z= 4.324 
p< 0.001 
59.4% 
z= 6.285 
p< 0.001 
61.9% 
z= 8.066 
p< 0.001 
    Renewable 
Energy 
 
55.6% 
z= 1.974 
p= 0.048 
53.9% 
z= 2.892 
p= 0.004 
     Rural 
Supplies 
 
52.3% 
z= 1.440 
p= 0.150 
Table B.1. Wilcoxon sign-rank tests for pairwise comparisons of all improvements (reporting the percentage of participants who gave a lower 
ranking to the row improvement to each column pairwise comparison)
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Renewable 
Energy 
Rural 
Supplies 
Interruptions 
to Supply 
External 
Sewer 
Flooding 
59.9% 
z= 5.314 
p< 0.001 
61.1% 
z= 7.566 
p< 0.001 
68.1% 
z= 8.511 
p< 0.001 
 Renewable 
Energy  
55.6% 
z= 1.622 
p= 0.105 
53.9% 
z= 3.102 
p= 0.002 
  Rural 
Supplies 
52.3% 
z= 1.481 
p= 0.139 
 
Table B.2. Wilcoxon sign-rank tests for pairwise comparisons of target improvements 
(reporting the percentage of participants who gave a lower ranking to the row improvement to 
each column pairwise comparison) 
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Appendix C – Analysis of the distributions of rankings of improvements in the Ranking 
task 
Histograms - Target Improvements - All 
Figure C.1. Histogram of the rankings of Interruptions to Supply in the Ranking task (top 
left) 
Figure C.2. Histogram of the rankings of External Sewer Flooding in the Ranking task (top 
right) 
Figure C.3. Histogram of the rankings of Rural Supplies in the Ranking task (bottom left) 
Figure C.4. Histogram of the rankings of Renewable Energy in the Ranking task (bottom 
right) 
 
 
 
 
 
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
.2
5
.3
D
en
si
ty
0 2 4 6 8
Interruptions to Supply
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
.2
5
.3
D
en
si
ty
0 2 4 6 8
External Sewer Flooding
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
.2
5
.3
D
en
si
ty
0 2 4 6 8
Renewable Energy
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
.2
5
.3
D
en
si
ty
0 2 4 6 8
Rural Supplies
38 
 
Histograms - Other Improvements – All 
Figure C.5. Histogram of the rankings of Supply Pipe Leakages in the Ranking task (top left) 
Figure C.6. Histogram of rankings of Drinking Water Quality in the Ranking task (top right) 
Figure C.7. Histogram of rankings of Beach/ River Cleanliness in the Ranking task (bottom 
left) 
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Histograms - Target Improvements – Only 
 
Figure C.8. Histogram of the rankings of Interruptions to Supply among target improvements 
only in the Ranking task (top left) 
Figure C.9. Histogram of the rankings of External Sewer Flooding among target 
improvements only in the Ranking task (top right) 
Figure C.10. Histogram of the rankings of Rural Supplies among target improvements only 
in the Ranking task (bottom left) 
Figure C.11. Histogram of the rankings of Renewable Energy among target improvements 
only in the Ranking task (bottom right) 
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Table C.1 below reports the results of variance ratio tests for a number of pairwise comparisons 
of improvements. Both Renewable Energy and Drinking Water Quality indicate evidence of a 
U-shaped distribution. Results of variance ratio test for pairwise comparisons of improvements 
with Renewable Energy and Drinking Water Quality separately are provided below. To account 
for potential increased likelihood of Type I error (i.e. incorrectly rejecting a null hypothesis) 
which is associated with conducting repeated analyses, we test each individual hypothesis using 
a Bonferroni correction. The critical value is therefore 0.1/5 = 0.02, and null hypotheses are 
rejected for tests that report p-values below this critical value. As shown below, results suggest 
that variance is larger and statistically significant for these two distributions versus other 
improvements, with the exception of the comparison between Renewable Energy and Rural 
Supplies which falls just short of statistical significance. Overall this is indicative of a more 
varied response range across individuals for both Renewable Energy and Drinking Water 
Quality than other improvements. 
Renewable Energy (SD: 2.086) F-stat p-value 
Interruptions to Supply (SD:1.876) 1.236 0.010 
External Sewer Flooding (SD: 1.773) 1.384 < 0.001 
Rural Supplies (SD: 1.898) 1.209 0.021 
Supply Pipe Leakages (SD: 1.818) 1.317 < 0.001 
Beach/ River Cleanliness (SD: 1.800) 1.343 < 0.001 
Drinking Water Quality (SD: 2.144)   
Interruptions to Supply (SD:1.877) 1.305 0.001 
External Sewer Flooding (SD: 1.773) 1.461 < 0.001 
Rural Supplies (SD: 1.898) 1.276 0.003 
Supply Pipe Leakages (SD: 1.818) 1.390 < 0.001 
Beach/ River Cleanliness (SD: 1.800) 1.418 < 0.001 
Table C.1. Results of variance ratio tests for pairwise comparisons of improvements with 
Renewable Energy and Drinking Water Quality separately 
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Appendix D – Ranking Task Parametric Results 
Here we report the results of statistical analyses which aim to isolate the individual effects of 
presentation, experience and demographic effects on participants’ rankings for each of the 
seven possible service improvements in the ranking task. For each possible improvement we 
ran a separate ordered logistic regression. The dependent variable was the ranking (from 1 - 7) 
for that improvement, and presentation order, platform, experience and demographic 
characteristics were used as the independent variables, with log odds reported. 
Table D.1 reports the results for the four target improvements and Table D.2 reports the results 
for the remaining three improvements. For ease of interpretation, Tables D.1 and D.2 do not 
report the coefficients for “I don’t know”/ “Prefer not to say” responses to any experience or 
demographic questions, although these were controlled for in the models. The inclusion of 
multiple demographic variables leads to some models failing standard assumption checks for 
ordered logistic regression models. However, the use of more appropriate models do not 
substantively change outcomes and so ordered logistic regressions are used for ease of 
interpretation45. Any meaningful effects of presentation, platform, demographic or experience 
effects in this stage are reported in Appendices H - L. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 A Brant test for the proportional odds assumption could not be computed for all of the models as a result of the 
inclusion of “Prefer Not to Say” choices for demographic variables, where there was insufficient sample size to 
compute binary logits across all variables. Removing these from analyses enabled a Brant test to be computed 
for all but Model 2. There were insufficient observations at the extreme rankings for Model 2. Pooling rankings 
1 and 2, and rankings 6 and 7 in Model 2 overcame this issue without substantively changing results.  
5 Models 1 (p= 0.268), 4 (p= 0.360), 5 (p= 0.281) and 7 (p=0.397) passed their corresponding Brant tests. Whilst 
all included variables in Models 2 (p= 0.015), 3 (p= 0.003) and 6 (p= 0.034) did not pass the proportional odds 
assumption, the sample size is sufficiently large and the difference in changes between ranking values does not 
influence interpretation of the key results, and so ordered logistic regression is a preferred model to a 
generalised ordered logistic regression (Williams, 2016). 
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 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Ranking Task Interruptions to 
Supply 
External Sewer 
Flooding 
Rural Supplies Renewable Energy 
     
Order – First Page (Ref: No)     
Yes -0.5575*** -0.7322*** -0.5736*** -0.6129*** 
 (0.152) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150) 
Online (Ref: No)     
Yes -0.2488 0.2356 -0.2585 0.4792** 
 (0.207) (0.204) (0.206) (0.206) 
CT Band (Ref: A / B / C)     
D / E 0.1443 -0.0795 -0.0224 -0.2623 
 (0.183) (0.179) (0.180) (0.184) 
F / G / H -0.0960 -0.3414 0.0442 -0.0514 
 (0.247) (0.245) (0.243) (0.251) 
Age (Ref: 18 – 40)     
41 - 60 0.1496 -0.3903** 0.5659*** 0.4873** 
 (0.191) (0.186) (0.189) (0.191) 
61 + -0.4545 -0.5096* 0.6650** 0.7663** 
 (0.311) (0.309) (0.313) (0.311) 
Gender (Ref: Female)     
Male 0.0514 0.1654 0.1944 -0.0742 
 (0.152) (0.151) (0.153) (0.157) 
Employment (Ref: Employed)     
Unemployed 0.1341 0.0289 -0.1162 -0.3828 
 (0.235) (0.227) (0.246) (0.241) 
Retired 0.8354*** -0.0616 -0.0897 -0.3510 
 (0.289) (0.288) (0.290) (0.287) 
Degree (Ref: No)     
Yes 0.2775* -0.1740 0.1496 -0.2497 
 (0.163) (0.161) (0.162) (0.163) 
Location (Ref: Urban)     
Rural -0.2488 -0.3381* -0.1151 0.1709 
 (0.181) (0.180) (0.179) (0.183) 
Bill Payer (Ref: No)     
Yes -0.0434 -0.0307 0.4165* -0.3162 
 (0.240) (0.240) (0.240) (0.244) 
Bill Discount (Ref: No)     
Yes 0.0443 -0.2265 0.1645 0.1176 
 (0.171) (0.168) (0.174) (0.173) 
Issue Experience (Ref: Yes – Within 1 Year)     
Yes - More than 1 Year ago 0.4325* -0.1451 ------- ------- 
 (0.227) (0.317) ------- ------- 
No – Never 0.2874 0.0958 ------- ------- 
 (0.208) (0.244) ------- ------- 
Water Connection (Ref: Public Supply)     
Private Supply ------- ------- -0.0543 ------- 
 ------- ------- (0.411) ------- 
Fossil Fuel Concern (Ref: Yes)     
Neutral ------- ------- ------- 1.1316*** 
 ------- ------- ------- (0.180) 
No ------- ------- ------- 1.7899*** 
 ------- ------- ------- (0.216) 
Number of Participants 599 599 599 599 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table D.1. Results of ordered logistic models for the Ranking task with log odds reported 
(coefficients for “Prefer not to say” responses not reported) 
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 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Ranking Task Supply Pipe 
Leakages 
Drinking Water 
Quality 
River/ Beach 
Cleanliness 
    
Order – First Page (Ref: No)    
Yes -0.6052*** -0.8422*** -0.7414*** 
 (0.149) (0.152) (0.149) 
Online (Ref: No)    
Yes -0.2468 -0.3046 0.1946 
 (0.200) (0.208) (0.211) 
CT Band (Ref: A / B / C)    
D / E 0.0723 0.0930 -0.0586 
 (0.180) (0.176) (0.179) 
F / G / H 0.0127 0.1815 -0.0535 
 (0.247) (0.257) (0.243) 
Age (Ref: 18 – 40)    
41 - 60 -0.5938*** -0.2979 0.0022 
 (0.188) (0.191) (0.190) 
61 + -1.1120*** -0.3372 0.6720** 
 (0.301) (0.300) (0.311) 
Gender (Ref: Female)    
Male -0.3342** -0.2858* 0.1553 
 (0.152) (0.151) (0.153) 
Employment (Ref: Employed)    
Unemployed -0.0086 0.1933 0.0886 
 (0.230) (0.235) (0.236) 
Retired -0.1504 0.3166 -0.4921* 
 (0.281) (0.281) (0.290) 
Degree (Ref: No)    
Yes -0.1100 0.3151* -0.0352 
 (0.164) (0.162) (0.162) 
Location (Ref: Urban)    
Rural -0.2619 0.2671 0.4526** 
 (0.180) (0.177) (0.179) 
Bill Payer (Ref: No)    
Yes -0.4671** 0.4418* 0.1118 
 (0.235) (0.242) (0.240) 
Bill Discount (Ref: No)    
Yes 0.0391 0.0426 0.0056 
 (0.167) (0.169) (0.169) 
Water Site Visits (Ref: More than Monthly)    
Less than Monthly ------- ------- 0.1595 
 ------- ------- (0.153) 
Number of Participants 599 599 599 
Table D.2. Results of ordered logistic models for the Ranking task with log odds reported 
(coefficients for “Prefer not to say” responses not reported) 
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Appendix E – Basic Slider Task vs. Cost Revelation Task Parametric Results 
Here we report the results of statistical analyses which aim to isolate the individual effects of 
stage type, platform, experience and demographic effects on participants’ allocations to each 
of the four target improvements in the Basic Slider and Cost Revelation tasks. Table E.1 reports 
the absolute differences in allocations across the Basic Slider and Cost Revelation tasks. Table 
E.2 reports the platform, experience and demographic effects on these differences between the 
two tasks. For ease of interpretation, Tables E.1 and E.2 do not report the coefficients for “I 
don’t know”/ “Prefer not to say” responses to any experience or demographic questions, 
although these were controlled for in the models. Any meaningful effects of platform, 
demographic or experience effects in this stage are reported in Appendices H and J-L. 
Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality for each target improvement suggest that the absolute 
allocations were not normally distributed in either the Basic Slider or Cost Revelation tasks for 
all target improvement (p< 0.001 for all tests) rendering any OLS regression inappropriate. As 
such the raw allocations were categorised into five categories: 0% - 5%; 10% - 15%; 20% - 
25%; 30% - 35%; 40% +. Due to the non-independence of responses at the individual level a 
random-effects panel ordered logistic regression was used, clustered at the individual level, 
with allocation category as the dependent variable (although results did not substantively differ 
when a random-effects linear regression was run on the raw allocations). 
In all models in Table E.1, the difference between the Basic Slider and Cost Revelation tasks 
mimics the results of the non-parametric statistics, once allowing for other demographic 
effects. Revealing cost information reduces likelihood to give a higher allocation for External 
Sewer Flooding and Rural Supplies, but results are not statistically significant (p= 0.295, p= 
0.979, respectively), and significantly reduces likelihood to give a higher allocation for 
Renewable Energy (p= 0.058). Revealing cost information increases likelihood to give a higher 
allocation for Interruptions to Supply, but this is not statistically significant (p= 0.130). 
When comparing the differences between the Basic Slider and Cost Revelation tasks, Shapiro-
Wilk tests of normality for each target improvement suggest that the differences in allocations 
were not normally distributed (p< 0.001 for all tests) rendering any OLS regression 
inappropriate. As such the raw differences were categorised into five categories: Less than - 
10%; -5% - -10%; 0%; 5% - 10%; Greater than 10%. In all models in Table E.2 an ordered 
logistic regression was run, and these models satisfied the standard assumption checks for 
ordered logistic regression models6.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 A Brant test for the proportional odds assumption could not be computed for all of the models as a result of the 
inclusion of “Prefer Not to Say” choices for demographic variables, where there was insufficient sample size to 
compute binary logits across all variables. Models 1 (p= 0.435), 2 (p= 0.335), 3 (p= 0.555) and 4 (p= 0.661) all 
passed the proportional odds assumption when these “Prefer Not to Say” choices were removed, without 
substantively changing results. 
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 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
Basic Slider vs. Cost Revelation 
Interruptions to 
Supply 
External Sewer 
Flooding 
Rural Supplies Renewable Energy 
Absolute Allocation     
Stage (Ref: Basic Slider)     
Cost Revelation 0.1825 -0.1220 -0.0031 -0.2330* 
 (0.120) (0.117) (0.119) (0.123) 
Online (Ref: No)     
Yes 0.4761 0.2518 -0.2267 -0.6565 
 (0.396) (0.304) (0.389) (0.422) 
CT Band (Ref: A / B / C)     
D / E -0.1925 -0.2056 0.2942 0.0233 
 (0.344) (0.264) (0.337) (0.369) 
F / G / H -0.1260 0.4467 -0.1774 -0.4646 
 (0.478) (0.373) (0.468) (0.506) 
Age (Ref: 18 – 40)     
41 - 60 1.2008*** 0.9339*** -0.5210 -0.4435 
 (0.367) (0.280) (0.355) (0.383) 
61 + 2.1671*** 0.6721 -1.1633** -0.8325 
 (0.605) (0.459) (0.582) (0.621) 
Gender (Ref: Female)     
Male 0.3276 -0.1417 -0.5569* -0.1308 
 (0.293) (0.226) (0.287) (0.311) 
Employment (Ref: Employed)     
Unemployed 0.8734* -0.3972 -0.6213 0.3015 
 (0.455) (0.342) (0.440) (0.477) 
Retired -1.2408** 0.7658* 0.4902 0.3152 
 (0.558) (0.431) (0.543) (0.576) 
Degree (Ref: No)     
Yes -0.5429* 0.1554 -0.6665** 0.4381 
 (0.310) (0.240) (0.305) (0.331) 
Location (Ref: Urban)     
Rural -0.6971** 0.1274 0.6297* -1.2298*** 
 (0.349) (0.270) (0.343) (0.368) 
Bill Payer (Ref: No)     
Yes 0.0562 0.3215 -0.6957 -0.3247 
 (0.456) (0.356) (0.448) (0.486) 
Bill Discount (Ref: No)     
Yes 0.1125 0.1401 -0.2127 -0.4264 
 (0.326) (0.252) (0.322) (0.345) 
Issue Experience (Ref: Yes – Within 1 Year)     
Yes - More than 1 Year ago -0.6986 0.0985 ------- ------- 
 (0.427) (0.499) ------- ------- 
No - Never -0.3843 -0.0166 ------- ------- 
 (0.394) (0.384) ------- ------- 
Water Connection (Ref: Public Supply)     
Private Supply ------- ------- -0.6745 ------- 
 ------- ------- (0.733) ------- 
Fossil Fuel Concern (Ref: Yes)     
Neutral ------- ------- ------- -2.1998*** 
 ------- ------- ------- (0.370) 
No ------- ------- ------- -3.9724*** 
 ------- ------- ------- (0.447) 
Number of Observations 1,198 1,198 1,198 1,198 
Number of Participants 599 599 599 599 
Table E.1. Results of panel ordered logistic models for Basic Slider/ Cost Revelation task 
with log odds reported (coefficients for “Prefer not to say” responses not reported) 
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 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
Basic Slider vs. Cost Revelation 
Interruptions to 
Supply 
External Sewer 
Flooding 
Rural Supplies Renewable Energy 
Relative Difference     
Online (Ref: No)     
Yes -0.0867 0.0041 0.2507 -0.0773 
 (0.216) (0.218) (0.221) (0.223) 
CT Band (Ref: A / B / C)     
D / E 0.0468 -0.0462 0.1649 0.0106 
 (0.186) (0.183) (0.189) (0.191) 
F / G / H 0.1048 -0.1226 -0.0523 0.2563 
 (0.259) (0.262) (0.264) (0.262) 
Age (Ref: 18 – 40)     
41 - 60 0.1628 -0.2117 0.1897 0.2545 
 (0.197) (0.195) (0.196) (0.197) 
61 + 0.6267* -0.1201 -0.1505 -0.0291 
 (0.323) (0.318) (0.325) (0.323) 
Gender (Ref: Female)     
Male -0.3649** 0.2471 0.0427 0.2421 
 (0.160) (0.157) (0.160) (0.159) 
Employment (Ref: Employed)     
Unemployed 0.3081 0.1485 -0.2672 -0.1401 
 (0.245) (0.243) (0.247) (0.248) 
Retired -0.3229 0.4608 0.0142 -0.2544 
 (0.298) (0.295) (0.303) (0.299) 
Degree (Ref: No)     
Yes 0.1980 0.1458 -0.2134 0.0150 
 (0.167) (0.167) (0.170) (0.170) 
Location (Ref: Urban)     
Rural -0.0297 -0.0517 -0.5233*** 0.3217* 
 (0.187) (0.188) (0.192) (0.187) 
Bill Payer (Ref: No)     
Yes 0.5107** -0.5648** -0.0385 0.2021 
 (0.248) (0.250) (0.249) (0.250) 
Bill Discount (Ref: No)     
Yes -0.0041 0.2004 -0.3220* -0.1413 
 (0.176) (0.175) (0.179) (0.176) 
Issue Experience (Ref: Yes – Within 1 Year)     
Yes - More than 1 Year ago -0.3020 0.0159 ------- ------- 
 (0.232) (0.354) ------- ------- 
No - Never -0.1276 -0.2307 ------- ------- 
 (0.216) (0.279) ------- ------- 
Water Connection (Ref: Public Supply)     
Private Supply ------- ------- 0.5530 ------- 
 ------- ------- (0.402) ------- 
Fossil Fuel Concern (Ref: Yes)     
Neutral ------- ------- ------- -0.1877 
 ------- ------- ------- (0.183) 
No ------- ------- ------- -0.2820 
 ------- ------- ------- (0.213) 
Number of Participants 599 599 599 599 
Table E.2. Results of ordered logistic models for Basic Slider/ Cost Revelation task with log 
odds reported (coefficients for “Prefer not to say” responses not reported) 
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Appendix F - Cost Revelation vs. Time Horizon Task Parametric Results 
Here we report the results of statistical analyses which aim to isolate the individual effects of 
stage type, platform and demographic effects on participants’ allocations to each of the four 
time horizons in the Cost Revelation and Time Horizon tasks. Table F.1 reports the absolute 
differences in allocations across the Cost Revelation and Time Horizon tasks. Table F.2 reports 
the platform and demographic effects on these differences between the two tasks. For ease of 
interpretation, Tables F.1 and F.2 do not report the coefficients for “I don’t know”/ “Prefer not 
to say” responses to any experience or demographic questions, although these were controlled 
for in the models. Any meaningful effects of platform or demographic in this stage are reported 
in Appendices H, J and K. 
Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality for each time horizon suggest that the absolute allocations were 
not normally distributed in either the Cost Revelation or Time Horizon tasks for all time 
horizons (p< 0.001 for all tests) rendering any OLS regression inappropriate. As such the raw 
allocations were categorised into five categories: 0% - 5%; 10% - 15%; 20% - 25%; 30% - 
35%; 40% +. Due to the non-independence of responses at the individual level a random-effects 
panel ordered logistic regression was used, clustered at the individual level, with allocation 
category as the dependent variable (although results did not substantively differ when a 
random-effects linear regression was run on the raw allocations). 
In all models in Table F.1, the difference between the Cost Revelation and Time Horizon tasks 
mimics the results of the non-parametric statistics, once allowing for other demographic 
effects. Revealing time horizon information significantly increases likelihood to give a higher 
allocation for “Immediately” improvements (p= 0.004). It significantly reduces likelihood to 
give a higher allocation for “5 Years” improvements (p= 0.024), and produces no significant 
difference in likelihood to give a higher allocation for “10 Years” (p= 0.648) and “25 Years” 
(p= 0.120) improvements. For “Immediately” and “5 Years”, higher allocations were more 
likely for External Sewer Flooding than Interruptions to Supply (p< 0.001 for both) and for “10 
Years” and “25 Years”, higher allocations were more likely for Renewable Energy than Rural 
Supplies (p< 0.001, p= 0.009, respectively). 
When comparing the differences between the Cost Revelation and Time Horizon tasks, 
Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality for each time horizon suggest that the differences in allocations 
were not normally distributed (p< 0.001 for all tests) rendering any OLS regression 
inappropriate. As such the raw differences were categorised into five categories: Less than - 
10%; -5% - -10%; 0%; 5% - 10%; Greater than 10%. In all models in Table F.2 an ordered 
logistic regression was run, although not all models satisfied the standard assumption checks 
for ordered logistic regression models. However, the use of more appropriate models does not 
substantively change outcomes7. 
 
7 A Brant test for the proportional odds assumption could not be computed for all of the models as a result of the 
inclusion of “Prefer Not to Say” choices for demographic variables, where there was insufficient sample size to 
compute binary logits across all variables. Models 1 (p= 0.154) and 3 (p= 0.315) passed the proportional odds 
assumption when these “Prefer Not to Say” choices were removed, without substantively changing results. 
Model 4 did not pass the proportional odds assumption when these “Prefer Not to Say” choices were removed 
(p= 0.073) but the sample size is sufficiently large and the difference in changes between categories does not 
influence interpretation of the key results, and so ordered logistic regression is a preferred model to a 
generalised ordered logistic regression. There were insufficient observations at the extreme categories for Model 
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 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Cost Revelation vs. Time Horizon Immediately 5 Years 10 Years 25 Years 
Absolute Allocation     
Stage (Ref: Cost Revelation)     
Time Horizon 0.3579*** -0.2805** 0.0567 -0.1950 
 (0.123) (0.124) (0.124) (0.125) 
Improvement (Ref: Interruption to Supply)     
External Sewer Flooding 1.4898*** 1.3426*** ------- ------- 
 (0.306) (0.311) ------- ------- 
Improvement (Ref: Rural Supplies)     
Renewable Energy ------- ------- 1.4769*** 0.9568*** 
 ------- ------- (0.349) (0.364) 
Online (Ref: No)     
Yes 0.0916 0.4237 -0.1263 -0.6670 
 (0.417) (0.424) (0.477) (0.508) 
CT Band (Ref: A / B / C)     
D / E 0.1035 -0.4715 0.7995* -1.0757** 
 (0.365) (0.371) (0.419) (0.441) 
F / G / H 0.0124 0.1715 -0.0162 -1.0561* 
 (0.509) (0.518) (0.577) (0.614) 
Age (Ref: 18 – 40)     
41 - 60 0.6091 1.5012*** -0.7613* -0.1938 
 (0.383) (0.394) (0.439) (0.460) 
61 + 0.8490 2.0234*** -1.2887* -1.1762 
 (0.634) (0.647) (0.720) (0.758) 
Gender (Ref: Female)     
Male 0.0002 0.1494 -0.4144 -0.4599 
 (0.309) (0.316) (0.354) (0.373) 
Employment (Ref: Employed)     
Unemployed -0.2965 0.5598 0.3273 -0.5692 
 (0.473) (0.483) (0.544) (0.572) 
Retired 0.1345 -0.3487 0.6629 0.5047 
 (0.590) (0.602) (0.668) (0.708) 
Degree (Ref: No)     
Yes -0.2887 -0.0260 -0.1757 0.3869 
 (0.330) (0.337) (0.379) (0.399) 
Location (Ref: Urban)     
Rural -0.0168 -0.4024 -0.7513* -0.2372 
 (0.368) (0.373) (0.421) (0.441) 
Bill Payer (Ref: No)     
Yes 0.3523 -0.3483 -0.6048 -0.2631 
 (0.484) (0.493) (0.558) (0.585) 
Bill Discount (Ref: No)     
Yes -0.0208 0.2891 -0.1126 -0.6611 
 (0.347) (0.352) (0.395) (0.418) 
Number of Observations 1,198 1,198 1,198 1,198 
Number of Participants 599 599 599 599 
Table F.1. Results of panel ordered logistic models for Cost Revelation/ Time Horizon task 
with log odds reported (coefficients for “Prefer not to say” responses not reported) 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Pooling categories 1 and 2, and categories 4 and 5 in Model 2 overcame this issue without substantively 
changing results and the model passed the proportional odds assumption (p= 0.565). 
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 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Cost Revelation vs. Time Horizon Immediately 5 Years 10 Years 25 Years 
Relative Difference     
Improvement (Ref: Interruption to Supply)     
External Sewer Flooding -0.0125 0.3532** ------- ------- 
 (0.156) (0.158) ------- ------- 
Improvement (Ref: Rural Supplies)     
Renewable Energy ------- ------- -0.0328 -0.0369 
 ------- ------- (0.158) (0.158) 
Online (Ref: No)     
Yes -0.2632 0.1277 -0.0038 0.1590 
 (0.212) (0.215) (0.218) (0.219) 
CT Band (Ref: A / B / C)     
D / E 0.2857 -0.1324 0.0828 -0.2681 
 (0.190) (0.189) (0.190) (0.194) 
F / G / H 0.1303 0.4272 -0.1095 -0.3084 
 (0.261) (0.264) (0.266) (0.265) 
Age (Ref: 18 – 40)     
41 - 60 -0.1094 -0.0537 0.0767 0.0785 
 (0.199) (0.199) (0.201) (0.202) 
61 + -0.6541* -0.2104 0.3215 0.2087 
 (0.335) (0.321) (0.334) (0.325) 
Gender (Ref: Female)     
Male 0.0900 -0.0416 0.0750 -0.2312 
 (0.160) (0.161) (0.163) (0.162) 
Employment (Ref: Employed)     
Unemployed -0.0402 -0.6923*** 0.1067 0.7299*** 
 (0.249) (0.247) (0.247) (0.253) 
Retired 0.3140 -0.3193 -0.1022 0.1605 
 (0.309) (0.296) (0.311) (0.302) 
Degree (Ref: No)     
Yes -0.1746 -0.0034 0.0216 0.0906 
 (0.171) (0.173) (0.173) (0.174) 
Location (Ref: Urban)     
Rural -0.0820 0.0993 0.2571 -0.2035 
 (0.189) (0.193) (0.192) (0.191) 
Bill Payer (Ref: No)     
Yes -0.2949 0.0332 -0.2820 0.5788** 
 (0.253) (0.256) (0.252) (0.254) 
Bill Discount (Ref: No)     
Yes -0.2559 0.0245 0.1421 -0.0897 
 (0.181) (0.180) (0.183) (0.180) 
Number of Participants 599 599 599 599 
Table F.2. Results of ordered logistic models for Cost Revelation/ Time Horizon task with 
log odds reported (coefficients for “Prefer not to say” responses not reported) 
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Appendix G - Willingness-to-Pay Tasks Parametric Results 
Here we report the results of statistical analyses which aim to isolate the individual effects of 
stage type, platform, experience and demographic effects on participants’ willingness-to-pay. 
Table G.1 reports the results of four models – Models 1-3 report the results of logistic 
regressions, with the likelihood a participant would increase their willingness-to-pay by any 
amount (i.e. above £0) for each subsequent slider task as the dependent variable. Model 4 
reports the change in willingness-to-pay by stage type, platform, experience and demographic 
effects, conditional on participants indicating willingness to pay some increase in each stage. 
Due to the extreme right-skew of responses to the willingness-to-pay stage, in Model 4 the 
dependent variable is the logarithmic transformation of willingness-to-pay, and a Tobit 
regression was deemed appropriate to account for the lower censoring of the data. In addition, 
to account for the non-independence of responses at the individual level in Model 4 a random-
effects panel Tobit regression was used, clustered at the individual level. As a robustness check, 
Model 5 reports the results of an ordered logistic regression, when categorising willingness-to-
pay values according to the categories found in Table 3 in the main text. To allow for sufficient 
variation across stages and categories of willingness-to-pay, Model 5 excludes participants who 
did not report any change in willingness-to-pay across the three stages. Table G.1 does not 
report the coefficients for “I don’t know”/ “Prefer not to say” responses to any experience or 
demographic questions, although these were controlled for in the models. Any meaningful 
effects of platform or demographic effects in this stage are reported in Appendices H, J, and K. 
Results from Model 1 infer that platform type (being a face-to-face participant) (p< 0.001) and 
having a degree (p= 0.005) substantially increase the likelihood a participant would increase 
their willingness-to-pay without any additional cost or time horizon information. Face-to-face 
(p= 0.015) and younger participants, compared to 41-60 (p= 0.010) and 61+ (p= 0.026) year 
olds, were significantly more likely to increase their willingness-to-pay further once provided 
cost information, as seen in Model 2. Effects are reduced in Model 3, suggesting demographic 
characteristics were less significant in influencing the likelihood that a participant would 
increase their willingness-to-pay further once provided time horizon information, although this 
may in part be a result of the relatively small number of participants overall who increased their 
willingness-to-pay further in this task. 
The results from Model 4 support the findings of the non-parametric statistics. Compared to 
the Cost Revelation task, participants had a significantly lower willingness-to-pay in the first 
Willingness-to-Pay task (p< 0.001) and significantly higher willingness-to-pay in the Time 
Horizon task (p= 0.025). In addition, and in support of the non-parametric statistics, there was 
a positive and increasing effect of “Top Four Ranking Sum”; the number of target 
improvements ranked 1st – 4th in the Ranking task. Compared to those with only 1 target 
improvements ranked 1st – 4th in the Ranking task, those with 2 (p= 0.007) and 3 (p= 0.022) 
had a significantly higher willingness-to-pay overall. The coefficients and standard errors 
imply that there would not be a statistically significant difference between 2 and 3. The 
willingness-to-pay of online participants was significantly lower than those face-to-face (p= 
0.002). 
The results from Model 5 support the main findings of Model 4. Compared to the Cost 
Revelation task, participants were significantly less likely to report a higher category of 
willingness-to-pay in the first Willingness-to-Pay task (p< 0.001) and significantly more likely 
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to report a higher category of willingness-to-pay in the Time Horizon task (p= 0.009). The 
effects of platform type (p= 0.203) and “Top Four Ranking Sum” (p= 0.527, p= 0.134) were 
no longer significant. One plausible reason for this is that much of the overall effects of 
platform and “Top Four Ranking Sum” are being driven by participants who do not report 
differences in willingness-to-pay across tasks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
52 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Willingness-to-Pay Logit Logit Logit Tobit (Log WTP) Ordered Logit 
 WTP Cost Revelation Time Horizon All All 
Stage (Ref: Cost Revelation)      
Willingness-to-Pay ------- ------- ------- -0.0912*** -2.1019*** 
 ------- ------- ------- (0.014) (0.291) 
Time Horizon ------- ------- ------- 0.0314** 0.6681*** 
 ------- ------- ------- (0.014) (0.254) 
Online (Ref: No)      
Yes -1.7319*** -0.7346** -0.1039 -0.4441*** -1.4315 
 (0.325) (0.302) (0.440) (0.145) (1.125) 
Top Four Rating Sum (Ref: One)      
Two 0.3380 -0.4808* -0.5303 0.4176*** 0.6976 
 (0.223) (0.285) (0.352) (0.156) (1.103) 
Three 0.0635 -0.4397 -2.1298*** 0.4419** 2.2653 
 (0.284) (0.370) (0.774) (0.193) (1.511) 
Four ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- 
 ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- 
CT (Ref: A/B/C)      
D / E -0.2344 0.0404 -0.1405 0.2893** 0.5247 
 (0.220) (0.295) (0.406) (0.140) (1.182) 
F / G / H -0.3206 -0.1906 -0.5641 0.2202 1.1320 
 (0.310) (0.433) (0.632) (0.190) (1.686) 
Age (Ref: 18 – 40)      
41 - 60 -0.0930 -0.8072*** -0.9481** -0.0159 -0.6330 
 (0.233) (0.312) (0.445) (0.151) (1.252) 
61 + 0.3911 -1.1790** -0.0084 -0.0142 1.0566 
 (0.385) (0.528) (0.630) (0.216) (1.887) 
Gender (Ref: Female)      
Male -0.3340* -0.0235 0.3140 -0.0940 -1.0516 
 (0.187) (0.248) (0.340) (0.124) (0.971) 
Employment (Ref: Employed)      
Unemployed 0.5085* -0.1846 0.5369 -0.1626 -0.4618 
 (0.297) (0.401) (0.470) (0.177) (1.505) 
Retired -0.0608 0.6848 -0.1797 -0.2186 -2.7814 
 (0.353) (0.493) (0.629) (0.206) (1.750) 
Degree (Ref: No)      
Yes 0.5710*** -0.1170 0.2754 -0.0995 -1.0542 
 (0.202) (0.269) (0.363) (0.128) (1.090) 
Location (Ref: Urban)      
Rural -0.2589 0.2167 -0.9309* -0.0680 0.3745 
 (0.215) (0.293) (0.506) (0.150) (1.218) 
Bill Payer (Ref: No)      
Yes 0.0837 0.6908* 0.2805 0.0276 -0.4759 
 (0.300) (0.419) (0.567) (0.190) (1.531) 
Bill Discount (Ref: No)      
Yes -0.2261 -0.3406 0.0278 -0.0208 -1.4114 
 (0.208) (0.280) (0.369) (0.139) (1.103) 
Constant 1.8534*** -0.9034* -1.9854*** 2.5993*** ------- 
 (0.464) (0.539) (0.741) (0.259) ------- 
Number of Observations 596 590 590 1,062 375 
Number of Participants ------- ------- ------- 354 125 
Table G.1. Results of logistic regression models (Models 1-3), random-effects panel Tobit 
regression model (Model 4) and ordered logistic model for willingness-to-pay tasks with log 
odds reported in Models 1-3 and 5 (coefficients for “Prefer not to say” responses not 
reported) 
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Appendix H - Online vs. Face-to-Face 
This study was conducted both online and face-to-face. The degree to which responses differ 
across these platforms may raise methodological questions as to the role of online or laboratory 
studies in eliciting the attitudes of citizens. In general, the demographic characteristics between 
the two platform types were similar. Given our categorisation of demographic information, 
online and face-to-face participants did not differ by council tax group (χ2= 4.523, p= 0.104) 
age (χ2= 4.372, p= 0.112), gender (χ2= 0.042, p= 0.839), employment type (χ2= 0.752, p= 
0.687), educational attainment (χ2= 1.525, p= 0.217) or council tax discount receipt (χ2= 0.401, 
p= 0.526). A greater proportion of online participants lived in rural (rather than urban) locations 
(χ2= 5.289, p= 0.021) and were the main water bill payers (χ2= 3.342, p= 0.068), relative to 
face-to-face participants. 
Ranking Task 
Table H.1 below outlines the average rankings for each improvement when separated by study 
type. 
 Average Ranking ( / 7) 
 Online Face-to-Face t-stat p-value 
Interruptions to Supply 4.73 5.10 1.781 0.075 
External Sewer Flooding 3.78 3.54 -1.234 0.218 
Rural Supplies 4.60 4.87 1.288 0.198 
Renewable Energy 4.52 3.84 -2.981 0.003 
Target Improvements 4.41 4.34 -1.001 0.318 
Supply Pipe Leakages 3.34 3.57 1.139 0.255 
Drinking Water Quality 3.75 4.04 1.224 0.222 
Beach/ River Cleanliness 3.28 3.05 -1.169 0.243 
Other Improvements 3.46 3.55 1.001 0.318 
Table H.1. Average ranking of improvements by platform type 
 
For the majority of improvements there are few substantial differences between platform types. 
However, there is a large and statistically significant difference in the preferences for 
Renewable Energy, where face-to-face respondents ranked this improvement as significantly 
more important (t= -2.981, p= 0.003). The reverse was true for Interruptions to Supply, where 
online respondents ranked this improvement as significantly more important, although not to 
the same magnitude (t= 1.781, p= 0.075). Including platform type in the parametric models of 
each improvement in the Ranking task, platform type only significantly affected Renewable 
Energy, where online participants were significantly less likely to give this improvement a 
lower ranking, (p= 0.020), as shown in Tables D.1 and D.2. 
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Slider Tasks 
Table H.2 below reports the average allocations in the Basic Slider task between online and 
face-to-face participants. 
 Average Allocation 
 Online Face-to-Face t-stat p-value 
Interruptions to Supply 22.8% 20.6% -1.735 0.083 
External Sewer Flooding 29.0% 26.9% -1.517 0.130 
Personal Improvements 51.9% 47.5% -2.553 0.011 
Rural Supplies 21.6% 23.0% 1.025 0.306 
Renewable Energy 26.6% 29.5% 1.760 0.079 
Societal Improvements 48.2% 52.5% 2.553 0.011 
Table H.2. Average allocations in the Basic Slider task by platform type 
 
In keeping with the overall consistency between Ranking task and Basic Slider task as found 
in the main text, online participants allocated significantly more than face-to-face participants 
to Interruptions to Supply (t= -1.735, p= 0.083), and significantly less to Renewable Energy 
(t= 1.760, p= 0.079). Combining improvement types, online participants gave significantly 
more to personal improvements (and necessarily equivalently, significantly less to societal 
improvements) than face-to-face participants (t= -2.553, p= 0.011). 
Table H.3 below reports the average allocation differences between Basic Slider and Cost 
Revelation tasks, and between Cost Revelation and Time Horizon tasks. There were no 
significant differences in average difference as a result of additional information revelation. 
This suggests that, whilst participants on different platforms revealed systematic differences in 
their absolute preference for different types of improvements, there was no evidence of 
differences in the relative effects of information provision about these specific improvements. 
A lack of statistically significant differences between allocations is reflected in the parametric 
statistics in Tables E.1 and E.2, and Tables F.1 and F.2. 
 Average Allocation – Basic Slider and Cost Revelation 
 Online Face-to-Face t-stat p-value 
Interruptions to Supply 0.7% 0.6% -0.049 0.961 
External Sewer Flooding -0.5% 0.9% 1.088 0.277 
Rural Supplies 0.4% -1.4% -1.496 0.135 
Renewable Energy -0.6% -0.2% 0.347 0.729 
 Average Allocation – Cost Revelation and Time Horizon 
 Online Face-to-Face t-stat p-value 
Immediately 1.3% 1.6% 0.245 0.807 
5 Years -0.9% -0.7% 0.207 0.836 
10 Years -0.2% 0.2% 0.335 0.738 
25 Years -0.3% -1.1% -0.897 0.370 
Table H.3. Average differences in allocation across slider tasks by platform type 
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Willingness-to-Pay Tasks 
Table H.4 below reports the average willingness-to-pay and changes across slider tasks by 
platform type, and Table H.5 below reports the distribution of responses in the Willingness-to-
Pay task, separated by platform type. There is a large and statistically significant difference 
between the average willingness-to-pay by platform type, with face-to-face participants overall 
willing to pay 112.5% more than online participants (t= 5.423, p< 0.001). There is a substantial 
difference in the number of participants who would not increase their current annual water 
charge. Online participants were more than three times more likely to indicate a willingness-
to-pay additional charges of £0.00 than face-to-face participants (χ2= 33.20, p< 0.001). 
However, even amongst those willing to add something to their water charges, face-to-face 
participants were willing to pay 35.5% more than online participants (t= 2.443, p= 0.015). 
There was no statistically significant difference between platform type in the extent to which 
overall willingness-to-pay was influenced by either the Cost Revelation task (t= -0.023, p= 
0.982) or the Time Horizon task (t= 0.217, p= 0.829). A smaller proportion of online 
participants increased their willingness-to-pay when costs were revealed compared to face-to-
face (t= 5.367, p= 0.021). There was no difference in the proportion of respondents who 
increased their willingness-to-pay when time horizons were revealed (t= 0.425, p= 0.514). 
These differences are reflected in the parametric analyses of Table G.1. 
 Willingness-to-Pay 
 Online Face-to-Face t-stat p-value 
All £9.30 £19.76 5.423 < 0.001 
WTP > £0.00 £16.98 £23.01 2.443 0.015 
 Online Face-to-Face χ2-stat p-value 
WTP = £0.00 45.2% 14.1% 33.20 < 0.001 
 Average Difference – Cost Revelation and Willingness-to-Pay 
 Online Face-to-Face t-stat p-value 
All + £1.06 + £1.05 -0.023 0.982 
No WTP Increase 86.8% 77.8% 5.367 0.021 
 Average Difference – Time Horizon and Cost Revelation 
 Online Face-to-Face t-stat p-value 
All + £0.46 + £0.54 0.217 0.829 
No WTP Increase 92.8% 90.1% 0.425 0.514 
Table H.4. Difference in willingness-to-pay responses by platform type 
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 Online Face-to-Face 
 (n) (%) (n) (%) 
£0 226 45.2% 14 14.1% 
£1 - £5 83 16.6% 14 14.1% 
£6 - £10 63 12.6% 11 11.1% 
£11 - £20 70 14.0% 25 25.3% 
£21 - £30 23 4.6% 15 15.2% 
£31 - £40 8 1.6% 6 6.1% 
£41 - £50 10 2.0% 7 7.1% 
£51 - £75 13 2.6% 7 7.1% 
£76 + 4 0.8% 0 0.0% 
Table H.5. Distribution of willingness-to-pay responses in Willingness-to-Pay task, by 
platform type 
Together, the results separated by platform type imply a consistent theme. Although there are 
systematic differences between responses by platform, these are typically across absolute 
decisions (e.g. initial rankings, allocations or willingness-to-pays). There is little overall 
evidence of systematic differences in the relative decisions as a result of experimental changes. 
This suggests that participants are not responding differently to the changing stimuli within the 
experiment but rather have different a-priori preferences that differ according to platform type. 
It is not straightforward to identify the cause of these systematic differences. Face-to-face 
participants were paid substantially more for taking part than online participants, although there 
are potentially greater costs of attending an experimental session face-to-face. It could be 
plausible that a greater initial willingness-to-pay for face-to-face respondents is a reciprocal 
response to a higher participation payment. However, the finding of greater overall allocation 
to societal improvements over personal improvements is independent of any payment 
decisions. This suggests that the type of individual who engages with face-to-face market 
research studies is of a more altruistic predisposition than those who participate in online 
market research studies. 
Efforts have been made to minimise the potential for experimenter demand effects (e.g. Zizzo, 
2010) in this study. For most plausible issues, there would be little reason to distinguish these 
across platform type. However, face-to-face participants conducted the experiment in groups 
of approximately ten per session. The physical clicking of the mouse required to indicate an 
increased willingness-to-pay might have increased a social pressure to increase one’s own 
willingness-to-pay in the face-to-face studies that would not have been present in the online 
study. Again, this would not explain a propensity to allocate more to societal improvements. 
An alternative argument could be made that the mere presence of experimenters in the room 
whilst face-to-face participants were completing the study would encourage participants to 
indicate a greater willingness-to-pay. However, given that societal improvements were not 
marked as such, and were randomly ordered, there would have been no explicit indication that 
allocating more to societal improvements would in any way be beneficial to the experimenters 
(even if the experimenters were perceived to be representatives of the Scottish water industry). 
Altogether, the differences between platform types suggest a genuine difference in the a-priori 
attitudes of online and face-to-face respondents. 
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Appendix I - Order Effects 
In the Ranking task the order in which participants saw the descriptions of improvements was 
randomised across participants. In the Basic Slider task (and all subsequent slider tasks) the 
order in which participants saw the sliders on their screens was randomised across participants. 
From a methodological perspective it is important to consider whether the order in which 
participants saw improvements and sliders influenced their decisions. 
Ranking Task 
In the Ranking task, participants first saw the seven descriptions of possible water service 
issues and a potential improvement for each. These were separated over two pages, with four 
shown on the first screen and three on the second. The order of the specific descriptions was 
randomised across participants. The order of the descriptions was the same as the order of the 
ranking options in the ranking task. Therefore any participants who were not fully engaging 
with the ranking task (and instead simply ranking the improvements in the order in which they 
appeared in a list) would appear to be exhibiting order effects. There were three such 
participants, and these three are removed from subsequent analyses. 
Table I.1 below outlines the average ranking and likelihood to be ranked most important, by 
order of presentation. 
 Average 
Ranking 
Proportion of Ranking 
 ( / 7) 1st 1st - 4th 
1st 3.24 29.5% 70.3% 
2nd  3.59 20.8% 65.8% 
3rd  3.93 13.4% 59.7% 
4th  4.03 11.4% 55.5% 
First Page 3.69 18.8% 62.8% 
5th  4.28 7.9% 52.7% 
6th  4.48 8.7% 48.2% 
7th  4.46 8.2% 47.8% 
Second Page 4.41 8.3% 49.6% 
Table I.1. Average ranking and likelihood to be ranked as 1st or 1st - 4th most important by 
presentation order 
 
There is strong evidence of an order effect on improvement ranking. Those that were shown 
on the first page were ranked lower (i.e. more important) on average than those shown on the 
second page. In addition, when accounting for order in the parametric models of each 
improvement in the Ranking task, being shown on the first page significantly increased the 
likelihood of a lower ranking for all seven improvements (p< 0.001 for all), as shown in Tables 
D.1 and D.2. 
It is possible that the order effects are simply a result of participants not engaging with the 
ranking task and having a tendency to first select the options at the top of the list of options. 
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However, we argue that this is implausible. First, the level of consistency between Ranking 
tasks and slider tasks suggests that participants were acting on some consistent decision making 
process between each task, but one that was unlikely to be a result of simply memorising the 
order of preference in the Ranking task and replicating this in the slider tasks. It thus seems 
paradoxical that participants would not engage with the Ranking task but then successfully 
replicate their preferences from this task in the later slider tasks. Second, response time data in 
the Ranking task can be used as a proxy for effort level in this task. One would anticipate a 
participant who did not engage fully (i.e. ranking the options in the order in which they were 
presented) would take less time than those who deliberated their options. Indeed, the three 
online participants who selected the improvements in the exact order in which they were 
displayed completed the task in approximately one third of the time of the average response 
time. The strongest evidence of order effects in this task is the occurrence of the first presented 
improvement to be ranked as most important. There was no statistically significant difference 
in the average response times of those who ranked the first presented improvement as most 
important (65.7 secs, SD: 53.35) and those who did not rank the first presented improvement 
as most important (59.1 secs, SD: 68.35) (t= -1.131, p= 0.259) with those who ranked the first 
presented improvement as most important actually taking longer in this task. 
This finding is not problematic for the core aims of the study but does raise an interesting issue. 
It is probable that citizens do not frequently think about the range of potential water service 
improvements that the water industry may make. These results suggest that participants give 
disproportionate weight to the improvements they read about first. Given the level of 
consistency between the Ranking task and later slider tasks, this suggests that this weighting 
influenced not only their ranking of the improvements but also their consequent slider 
allocations and willingness-to-pay towards improvements. The findings here suggest that the 
order in which information is provided, and when, can have significant influence on how 
important a citizen judges that information to be. 
Slider Task 
In the Basic Slider task (and all consequent slider tasks), the order in which the four 
improvements were presented as sliders was randomised across participants. An order effect in 
these tasks might manifest itself as a greater increase in allocation to sliders presented at the 
top of each task. Figure I.1 below reports the average allocation by slider order in the Basic 
Slider task. 
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Figure I.1. Average allocation by slider order in Basic Slider task 
 
As can be seen, there were no substantial differences in allocation by order, with allocations 
close to equal across orders, ranging from 24.4% (4th) to 25.4% (2nd). This suggests further still 
that the order effects found in the Ranking task were a result of the reading of descriptions 
rather than through disengagement with the task itself, since if order effects were a more 
general occurrence then they could be expected to be present in this task also. 
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Appendix J - Council Tax Band 
As water charges in Scotland are fixed according to a property’s council tax band, participants 
were asked to input their council tax band in order to provide them with an accurate current 
annual water charge from which price changes could be made. 
As there were concerns that participants might not know their council tax band, a link to the 
Scottish Assessors Association website (www.saa.gov.uk) was provided, where participants 
could enter their address to find their own council tax band. Over one-fifth of participants 
(21.9%) availed of this option, suggesting that a substantial number of citizens are unaware (or 
required confirmation) of their council tax bands. An “I don’t know” option was provided for 
participants who were still unsure of their council tax band. 9.5% of participants selected this 
option (it is of interest to note that none of the 57 participants who selected “I don’t know” 
used the Scottish Assessors Association website link, suggesting that this was a useful tool for 
participants to find their council tax band). 
Table J.1 below outlines the 2018/19 annual water charges in Scotland for each council tax 
band, as well as the proportion of the study participants who selected each band and the national 
distribution of council tax band across all registered properties in Scotland8. 
 Council Tax Band 
 A B C D E F G H “I don’t 
know” 
Annual Cost £291.60 £340.20 £388.80 £437.40 £534.60 £631.80 £729.00 £874.80 N/A 
Study (n) 59 91 89 121 97 46 36 3 57 
Study (%) 10.9 16.8 16.4 22.3 17.9 8.5 6.6 0.6 N/A 
National (%) 20.8 22.9 16.1 13.5 13.4 7.8 5.0 0.5 N/A 
Table J.1. Distribution of council tax bands by study and national level 
 
Relative to the national distribution, citizens with the lowest council tax bands were slightly 
underrepresented. This may suggest that price rise acceptance in this study could be an 
overestimation of the true population average. However, it is possible to measure whether 
differences exist between responses based on council tax band within this sample population. 
Regarding the different stages of this study, there is some evidence that council tax band 
influenced responses in certain aspects of the study. Council tax bands were categorised into 
four groups (A/B/C; D/E; F/G/H; “I don’t know”). There is some evidence that participants in 
higher council tax bands were less likely to allocate more to the “25 Years” improvement across 
both Cost Revelation and Time Horizon tasks, as shown in Table F.1 (D/E, p= 0.015, F/G/H, 
p= 0.086). However, the actual difference between allocations across the two tasks did not 
differ by council tax band, as shown in Table F.2. There is some evidence that participants in 
higher council tax bands had a higher willingness-to-pay across all tasks, although this was 
only statistically significant for participants in bands D/E (p= 0.038) and not F/G/H (p= 0.246), 
 
8 Taken from: Scottish Assessors Association, 2019, Report 3 – Council Tax by Assessor/ Local Authority/ 
Council Tax Band, [online] Scottish Assessors Association, Available at: <https:// 
https://www.saa.gov.uk/general-statistics/?REPORT_NAME=ct_band#report_list > [Accessed 24/04/2019] 
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as shown in Table G.1. Overall however, there were no large or systematic differences in 
responses across the whole study by council tax band. 
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Appendix K - Demographic Information 
It is possible that belonging to certain demographic groups systematically influenced decisions 
throughout this study. Below we report any consistent and statistically significant differences 
in responses throughout this study. 
Age: In the Ranking task, comparisons of each improvement in Tables D.1 and D.2 suggest 
there is a general tendency for older participants (i.e. those aged 41-60 and 61+, relative to 
participants aged 18-40) to be more likely to give lower rankings for personal improvements. 
We identify personal improvements to be Interruptions to Supply, External Sewer Flooding 
and Drinking Water Quality. The societal improvements for which participants may not 
themselves directly benefit were Rural Supplies, Renewable Energy, Supply Pipe Leakages 
and River/ Beach Cleanliness. The exception to this is Supply Pipe Leakages, where 
participants aged both 41-60 (p= 0.002) and 61+ (p< 0.001) give this improvement a lower 
ranking. 
When pooling these improvements into personal and societal, older participants ranked 
personal improvements as significantly more important (41-60, p= 0.033; 61+, p= 0.097) when 
compared to 18-40 year olds. There was no significant difference between the two older groups 
(p= 0.664).The same was also true in the Basic Slider task, with older participants allocating 
significantly more to societal improvements than 18-40 year olds (41-60, p< 0.001; 61+, p< 
0.001). There was no significant difference between the two older groups (p= 0.723). This is 
illustrated in Table K.1 below. A similar effect is found in comparisons of both Basic Slider 
and Cost Revelation in Table E.1, as well as Cost Revelation and Time Horizon in Table F.1 
(where “Immediately” and “5 Years” feature only personal improvements). 
 Average Ranking ( / 7) Basic Slider Allocation 
 Personal Societal Personal Societal 
18 – 40 4.22 3.83 46.4% 53.6% 
41 – 60 4.02 3.99 53.8% 46.2% 
61 + 4.06 3.96 54.3% 45.7% 
 t-stat p-value t-stat p-value 
18 – 40 vs. 41 – 60 2.146 0.033 4.916 < 0.001 
18 – 40 vs. 61 + 1.662 0.097 5.168 < 0.001 
41 – 60 vs. 61 + -0.434 0.664 0.355 0.723 
Table K.1. Comparison of improvement type by average ranking in the Ranking task and 
average allocation in the Basic Slider task 
 
Gender: Overall there was little evidence of systematic differences in responses across the 
study by gender. 
Employment: Compared to employed participants, retired participants in general indicated a 
reduced preference for Interruptions to Supply in both the Ranking task in Table D.1 (p= 0.004) 
and across the Basic Slider and Cost Revelation tasks in Table E.1 (p= 0.026). There were no 
other systematic differences in responses across the study by employment type. 
Educational Attainment: Compared to participants without a degree, those with a degree in 
general indicated a reduced preference for Interruptions to Supply in both the Ranking task in 
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Table D.1 (p= 0.088) and across the Basic Slider and Cost Revelation tasks in Table E.1 (p= 
0.080). In addition participants with a degree were significantly more willing to allow some 
price increase in their water charge in the initial willingness-to-pay task as shown in Table G.1 
(p= 0.005). There was no significant difference by education attainment amongst those who 
were willing to increase their water charge, however. 
Location: Participants living in rural locations allocated significantly more towards Rural 
Supplies across the Basic Slider and Cost Revelation tasks (p= 0.066) and significantly less 
towards Interruptions to Supply (p= 0.080) and Renewable Energy (p= 0.001), compared to 
participants living in urban locations, as shown in Table E.1. However, rural participants were 
less likely to give more to Rural Supplies once cost information was revealed than urban 
participants (p= 0.006) as shown in Table E.2. 
Bill Payer/ Bill Discount: Overall there was little evidence of systematic differences in 
responses across the study by whether participants were the main bill payer of if they were in 
receipt of a council tax bill discount. 
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Appendix L - Experience Questionnaire 
It was reasoned that the attitudes of participants throughout this study may in part be 
determined by their experience with the issues presented to them. Through a series of multiple 
choice questions, this stage aimed to elicit participants’ experiences with the water industry in 
Scotland, and in particular their experiences with some of the specific issues presented 
throughout the study. The underlying premise was that participants who had experienced 
negative effects of service issues, or would be more directly affected by the negative 
consequences, would perceive these to be relatively more important than those who had never 
experienced them, or would not be so directly affected by their consequences. 
The first question in this stage related to participants’ experience of short term interruptions to 
supply. The response options asked participants if they had ever experienced short term 
interruptions to supply (lasting at least 6 hours) and if so to indicate how recently (via multiple 
choice response options ranging from “Yes, within the last month”, to “Yes, longer than three 
years ago”). Overall, 51.8% of all participants indicated that they had experienced a short term 
interruption to supply in their homes at some point. Data from the Scottish water industry 
estimates approximately 5,250 households are affected by interruptions to supply of 6-12 hours 
each year (approximately 0.2% of all households in Scotland). 19.5% of participants in this 
study claimed to have experienced an interruption to supply of 6-12 hours within the last year. 
It is possible that participants did not correctly discern the length of time of the interruption to 
supply that they had experienced, and reported having experienced a short-term interruption to 
supply even if it was not as long as the 6 hour criteria. Alternatively, it is also possible that 
participants were reporting incidences of supply interruption outside of their own home (such 
as a neighbour, family member or in a work place). 
Table L.1 below breaks down both the average ranking and basic slider allocation towards 
improving interruptions to supply by experience with this issue. 6.7% of participants selected 
the “I don’t know” option. When comparing a straightforward binary split, there was no 
significant difference in average ranking (t= 0.679, p= 0.497) or basic slider allocation (t= 
0.345, p= 0.730). There does appear to be a recency effect on relative importance, however, 
with those who experienced interruptions to supply within the last year ranking this 
improvement as significantly more important (t= 3.257, p= 0.001). This significant effect is 
observed in the parametric analysis of the Ranking task in Table D.1 also (p= 0.057). There 
was no significant difference by allocation amount (t= 0.766, p= 0.445). 
Interruptions to Supply Ranking Task 
( / 7) 
Basic Slider 
Allocation 
Yes 4.80 22.5% 
No 4.90 22.2% 
Yes – Less than one year ago 4.34 23.2% 
Yes – More than one year ago 5.07 22.1% 
No 4.90 22.2% 
Table L.1. Average ranking and basic slider allocation for Interruptions to Supply by 
experience of issue 
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The second question in this stage concerned experience with external sewer flooding, and was 
framed in the same way as the above question. Some 20.2% of participants claimed to have 
experienced external sewer flooding at some point. Table L.2 below breaks down both the 
average ranking and basic slider allocation towards improving external sewer flooding. 3.3% 
of participants selected the “I don’t know” option. There were no significant differences in 
average ranking (t= 0.844, p= 0.399) or basic slider allocation (t= 0.688, p= 0.492) between 
those who had or had not experienced external sewer flooding, nor any evidence of a recency 
effect for average ranking (t=-1.066, p= 0.289) or basic slider allocation (t= -0.763, p= 0.447) 
for those who had. 
External Sewer Flooding Ranking Task 
( / 7) 
Basic Slider 
Allocation 
Yes 3.60 28.0% 
No 3.75 28.9% 
Yes – Less than one year ago 3.75 27.0% 
Yes – More than one year ago 3.45 28.8% 
No 3.75 28.9% 
Table L.2. Average ranking and basic slider allocation for External Sewer Flooding by 
experience of issue 
 
The third question considered the type of water supply participants had in their homes. Those 
who are connected to a private water supply would directly benefit from increased investment 
in connecting to the public water system. Data from the Scottish water industry suggests 
approximately 3.6% of homes in Scotland have private water connections. 4.0% of participants 
indicated that they were connected to a private supply. 5.0% said they were connected to 
something other than the public/ private supply, or did not know. 
Table L.3 below breaks down both the average ranking and basic slider allocation towards 
increasing rural connections by water supply type. There were no significant differences in 
average ranking (t= 0.661, p= 0.509) or basic slider allocation (t= 0.209, p= 0.834) by water 
supply type.  
Rural Supplies Ranking Task 
( / 7) 
Basic Slider 
Allocation 
Public 4.67 21.8% 
Private 4.42 21.3% 
Table L.3. Average ranking and basic slider allocation for rural connections by water supply 
type 
 
The fourth question aimed to elicit participants’ general attitudes towards the reliance on fossil 
fuels and their impact on the environment. This was intended to be a proxy for general 
environmental awareness. How much an individual cares about the environment could impact 
the importance they give to increasing renewable energy reliance. The question participants 
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were asked was “How concerned are you of the effect of the use of fossil fuels on the 
environment in general (i.e. not just on the water system)?” and this was adapted from Kelly 
et al. (2004). Responses ranged from “extremely concerned” to “not at all concerned”, with 
“somewhat concerned” as a mid-point option. Table L.4 below breaks down both the average 
ranking and basic slider allocation towards increasing renewable energy production, by 
attitudes towards fossil fuel usage on the environment, categorising responses as positive 
“extremely/ very concerned”, neutral “somewhat concerned” and negative “not very/ not at all 
concerned”. 31.7% responded positively, 41.7% responded neutrally and 22.3% responded 
negatively. 4.2% of participants indicated that they were not sure or preferred not to say. 
Those who responded positively ranked increased renewable energy production as significantly 
more important (t= 6.702, p< 0.001) and allocated significantly more investment in the basic 
slider task than those who responded neutrally (t= 6.537, p< 0.001). In turn, those who 
responded neutrally ranked increased renewable energy production as significantly more 
important (t= 3.667, p< 0.001) and allocated significantly more investment in the basic slider 
task than those who responded negatively (t= 4.351, p< 0.001). These effects are observed in 
the parametric analyses of the Ranking task in Table D.1 (p< 0.001 for both) and the Basic 
Slider and Cost Revelation tasks in Table E.1 (p< 0.001 for both). 
Renewable Energy Ranking Task 
( / 7) 
Basic Slider 
Allocation 
Positive 3.36 34.8% 
Neutral 4.64 25.6% 
Negative 5.40 19.3% 
Table L.4. Average ranking and basic slider allocation for increasing share of renewable 
energy by attitudes towards fossil fuel usage on the environment 
 
Lastly, participants were also asked about the frequency of their visitations to water leisure 
sites (such as rivers, beaches and lochs). How important the cleanliness of beaches/ rivers 
would be may be dependent on how frequently a citizen visits them. Responses ranged from 
“At least once a day” to “less than once a year”. 45.7% of participants reported visiting these 
sites at least once a month, and 50.4% reported visiting less than once a month or less. 3.8% of 
participants were not sure. 
Table L.5 below breaks down average ranking of improving river/ beach cleanliness by water 
site visitation frequency. There was no significant difference in average ranking by visitation 
frequency (t= 0.826, p= 0.409). 
Improving River/ Beach 
Cleanliness 
Ranking 
Task ( / 7) 
At least once a month 3.16 
Less than once a month 3.28 
Table L.5. Average ranking for improving river/ beach cleanliness by water site visitation 
frequency 
67 
 
References 
Kelly, M., Kennedy, F., Faughnan, P., and Tovey, H. (2004), Environmental attitudes and 
behaviours: Ireland in comparative European perspective, Environmental Protection Agency 
Williams, R. (2016), Understanding and interpreting generalized ordered logit models, 
Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 40, 7-20 
Zizzo, D. J. (2010), Experimenter demand effects in economic experiments, Experimental 
Economics, 13, 75-98 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
